Real Property

Ontario: a messauge doesn’t necessarily engage the RPLA

The decision in Beniuk v. Leamington (Municipality) affirms an esoteric aspect of real property limitations (though to be fair, most aspects of the RPLA are esoteric).  It affirms that the presence of a messuage doesn’t necessarily engage the RPLA.

The plaintiffs argued that the tort of private nuisance to land was effectively an action to recover messuages and therefore subject to the s. 4 limitation period, which applies to actions for recovery of land.  Section 1 of the RPLA defines land to include “messauges”—a dwelling house, its out buildings, the area immediately surrounding the dwelling, and adjacent land appropriate to its use.  Whether or not the property was a messuage, the action concerned land, but was not to recover land.

Ontario: the limitation of breach of resulting trust claims

In Sinclair v. Harris, the plaintiff argued that no limitation period applies to claims for breach of a resulting trust relating to real property.  The court rejected this argument and found that the ten-year limitation period in s. 4 the RPLA applies. The defendant relied on a dubious interpretation of the Court of Appeal decision in Drakoulakos, in which some unlikely facts allowed me to make a successful s. 24 argument:

[18]           The first issue that needs to be resolved is what limitation period, if any, is applicable in this case.  There is a stark difference in the position of the parties.  The plaintiffs submit that no limitation is applicable to a resulting trust in equity.  The defendants submit that a 10-year limitation period applies to this trust.

[19]           The definition of a resulting trust is succinctly stated in Waters’ Law of Trusts in Canada 4th Ed.:

Broadly speaking, a resulting trust arises whenever legal or equitable title to property is in one party’s name, but that party is under an obligation to return it to the original title owner, or to the person who paid the purchase money for it.

See Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17 (CanLII) at para. 20.

[20]           The responding parties argue that the plaintiffs’ action should be dismissed because any resulting trust established on the evidence is statute barred.  They rely upon the 10-year limitation period found in s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15 (“RPLA”):

No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to some person through whom the person making or bringing it claims, or if the right did not accrue to any person through whom that person claims, then within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to the person making or bringing it.

[21]           In McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86 (CanLII), Rosenberg J.A. traced the history of the law of limitations in this province. With respect to s. 4, he held that it applied to constructive trusts where the claimant did not have any interest in the property until so declared by the court.  In other words, it applied to an equitable interest in land through the imposition of a constructive trust.

[22]           In Waterstone Properties Corp. v. Caledon (Town), 2017 ONCA 623 (CanLII), the court made it clear that the 10-year limitation period in s. 4 did not just apply to claims for the possession of land but would encompass claims of ownership of land advanced by way of a resulting trust (at para. 32):

The words “action to recover any land” in s. 4 of the RPLA are not limited to claims for possession of land or to regain something a plaintiff has lost. Rather, “to recover any land” means simply “to obtain any land by judgment of the Court” and thus these words also encompass claims for a declaration in respect of land and claims to the ownership of land advanced by way of resulting or constructive trust: Hartman Estate v. Hartfam Holdings Ltd., 2006 CanLII 266 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 69, at para. 56; McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86 (CanLII), 118 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 38 – 39.

[23]           The plaintiffs rely on the case of Drakoulakos v. Stirpe, 2017 ONCA 957 (CanLII).  This was an appeal of a summary judgment motion whereby the motions judge granted summary judgment on the basis that the claim was statute barred based on the basic limitation period of the Limitations Act 2002. In that case, more than 15 years had passed since the plaintiff had known or ought to have known he had an action arising from a resulting trust.  The Court of Appeal overturned the decision because there was no limitation period for a claim based upon the transitional provisions of the Limitations Act 2002, where there was no limitation period for the claim against the trustee of a resulting trust or property still in the possession of the trustee under the former Act and the claim was discovered before January 1, 2004.

[24]           These comments, which are relied upon by the plaintiffs to support their position that there are no limitations for any resulting trust, must be read with care. The Ontario Court of Appeal was dealing with the application of the transitional provisions when it came to a resulting trust.  They were not making broad statements that are applicable to the facts before me. I further see Drakoulakos as distinguishable.  In that case, the court was dealing with taxi licenses and shares in a company.  It was unconnected to any real property. Thus, the Real Property Limitations Act would have no application to it. Similarly, in McConnell v. Huxtable, (at para. 41) Rosenberg J.A. held that s. 4 did not apply where the claimant was seeking an interest in a pension or a business. See also The Equitable Trust Co. v. Marsig, 2012 ONCA 235 (CanLII) at para. 19.  I see no conflict in these authorities.

[25]           Likewise, comments made in McCracken v. Kossar, 2007 CanLII 4875 (ON SC), [2007] O.J. No. 664 (S.C.J.) at para. 36, relied upon by the plaintiff, that queries whether equitable trusts are subject to the RPLA have now been overtaken by the appellate authorities noted above, and must be viewed in that light.

[26]           The plaintiffs submit that the limitation period does not apply since the claim is not about land but it is about the monies that Ms. Rock gave the defendants.  I cannot agree.  First of all, it is clear from the statement of claim and the evidence that this claim is about a resulting trust in a piece of real property.  The monies were expressly given to the defendants so that they could purchase the home and land.  This is not a case where Ms. Rock gave a sum of money which was unrelated to any real property to the defendants.  Here the connection is clear and direct.  Further, to try and distinguish the defendants’ authorities on this basis is futile.  In most real property transactions, money is involved.  The RPLA cannot simply be avoided by an attempt to characterize the transaction as being about money and not land. The fact that the plaintiffs are not actually seeking the return of the Beeton property or any other piece of real property, does not avoid the application of s. 4 given what they are seeking is “money to be laid out in the purchase of land” which fits within the definition of “land” under the RPLA: Harvey v. Talon International Inc., 2017 ONCA 267 (CanLII) at paras. 50 to 54 (dealing with a return of a deposit on the purchase of land); Scicluna v. Solstice Two Ltd., 2018 ONCA 176 (CanLII) at para. 25 (dealing with relief from forfeiture of a deposit for the purchase of land); Goldhar Estate v. Mann, [2016] O.J. No. 6872 (S.C.J.) (holding that the Act applied to equitable mortgage).

[27]           In short, the plaintiffs’ claim is an action to recover land and as such falls within s. 4 of the RPLA.

Ontario: Court of Appeal on adverse possession and prescriptive easements

The Court of Appeal decision in Majewsky v. Veveris restates two real property principles:

  1. Adverse passion can be established with respect to lands registered under the Land Titles Act by possession meeting the necessary requirements during any continuous ten-year period prior to registration in Land Titles.
  2. To acquire a prescriptive easement whether under the doctrine of lost modern grant or by prescription under the RPLA, the claimant must demonstrate use that is continuous, uninterrupted, open, and peaceful for a period of 20 years.

Ontario: the Land Titles Act and possessory and prescriptive rights

Aragon (Wellesley) Development (Ontario) Corp. v. Piller Investements Ltd. will be useful to the real property bar for its summary of the effect of the Land Titles Act on possessory and prescriptive rights (starting at para. 122), abandonment of easements (starting at para. 154), and prescriptive easements (starting at para. 165).

 

 

Ontario: the limitation of stand-alone mortgage guarantees

In Hilson v. 1336365 Alberta Ltd., the court determined, for the first time, the limitation period for a stand-alone mortgage guarantee agreement. A stand-alone guarantee that affects or relates to an interest in land, and includes covenants to pay money secured by a mortgage, is subject to a ten year limitation period under s. 43(1) the Real Property Limitation Act.

[41]           The application of a predecessor provision to s. 43(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act (being s. 49(1)(k) of the Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1914, c. 75) was considered by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Martin v. Youngson (1924), 55 O.L.R. 658 (C.A.).  In that case, the mortgagee commenced an action against the guarantor of the mortgage more than ten years after the mortgage became due.  If the predecessor to s. 43(1) did not apply, the limitation period would have been 20 years.   Pursuant to s. 49(1)(b) of the predecessor statute, the 20-year limitation period applied to “an action under a bond, or other indenture, except upon a covenant contained in an indenture of mortgage”.  The guarantee covenant in Martin was contained in the mortgage indenture, which the guarantor had executed.  At p. 663, the court found that the applicable limitation period was ten years, as indicated below:

Dealing now with the successive points argued by the appellant, I think that this is “an action upon a covenant contained in an indenture of mortgage,” and therefore comes within sec. 49, subsec. 1(k), of the Limitations Act. The whole document, exhibit 1, is an indenture of mortgage. I express no opinion as to what would be the proper conclusion if the guaranty were contained in a separate collateral document. That point can be decided when it arises. But, so far as this action is concerned, it seems to me that it falls precisely within the words of the statute, and therefore that the period of limitation is 10 years, and not 20. [Emphasis added.]

[42]           In its 2012 decision in Equitable Trust, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered and affirmed its previous decision in Martin.  As in Martin, the issue in Equitable Trust was the applicable limitation period where the guarantee covenant was contained in the mortgage indenture that the guarantor signed, rather than in a “separate collateral document”.  Counsel did not bring to my attention any subsequent decision that considered whether the ten-year limitation period would apply to a claim under a guarantee covenant in a separate document, the issue that Martin expressly left outstanding.

[43]           In Equitable Trust, the guarantor argued that the limitation period for the guarantee contained in the mortgage was two years, based on the following reasoning.  The guarantee covenant in that case was a demand obligation governed by ss. 5(3) and (4) of the Limitations Act, 2002.  Those provisions were intended to apply to all demand obligations, including a demand guarantee obligation contained in a mortgage indenture.  The court rejected that argument.  Relying on s. 2(1)(a) of the Limitation Act, 2002, the court held that the ten-year limitation period in the Real Property Limitations Act applied.  In doing so, the court stated as follows (at paras. 27, 28, 30 and 31):

27        … [T]he effect of s. 2(1)(a) of the Limitations Act, 2002 is to preclude the limitation periods of that Act from applying when the Real Property Limitations Act applies. Put simply, the Limitations Act, 2002, was enacted to deal with limitation periods other than those affecting real property.

28        A guarantee given in conjunction with a mortgage transaction affects real property law rights. Guarantors, if they have made payments toward the mortgage debt, need to be served in mortgage enforcement proceedings because they have an equity of redemption and an interest in the mortgaged property…. [Case citations omitted.]

…

30        It is true that it may not always be easy to determine whether a particular guarantee … is subject to the Limitations Act, 2002 or, like the guarantee in the case at bar, is subject to the Real Property Limitations Act. However, it does not follow that all guarantees should be treated the same way. It has been the case historically that guarantees associated with land transactions have different limitation periods from guarantees associated with contract claims. Moreover, as already noted, it is my view that the Legislature intended that all limitation periods affecting land be governed by the Real Property Limitations Act.

31        The mortgage enforcement practice, as demonstrated in the case at bar, is to give guarantors notice of power of sale proceedings. In my view, it would cause much more confusion and uncertainty in the law, if the limitation period for enforcing the mortgage debt was different from the limitation period for enforcing guarantees of that debt. [Emphasis added].

[44]           In its subsequent decision in Zabanah v. Capital Direct Lending Corp., 2014 ONCA 872 (CanLII), 123 O.R. (3d) 350, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that it was appropriate to circumscribe the expansive expression in Equitable Trust (at para. 30) of the legislative intent that “all limitation periods affecting land be governed by the Real Property Limitations Act.”  In Zabanah, the assignee of a mortgage was unable to recover the amount due under the mortgage either from the mortgagor or upon the sale of the mortgaged property.  The assignee sued the original mortgagee for negligence and breach of contract.  Summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the original mortgagee on the basis that the action had not been commenced within the two-year limitation period in the Limitations Act, 2002.  The assignee argued on appeal that the ten-year limitation period in Real Property Limitations Act applied, relying on the statement in Equitable Trust that all limitation periods affecting land were governed by that statute.  The appeal court held that the motion judge was correct that the two-year limitation period applied.  The court distinguished Equitable Trust on that basis that the assignee’s action against the original mortgagee “is simply a negligence and contract claim, and is not a claim to an interest in land, as in [Equitable Trust].”

[45]           Defence counsel argued that as in Zabanah, the plaintiff’s claim against the Lightles under the stand-alone guarantees was a contract claim, not a claim to an interest in land.  By the same reasoning, the two-year limitation period would apply to the plaintiff’s claim against the Lightles under those agreements, according to the defence.

[46]            Defence counsel also argued that s. 43(1) of the Real Property Limitation Act does not apply because the stand-alone guarantees do not constitute an “other instrument … to repay the whole or any part of any money secured by a mortgage.”  While the term “instrument” is not defined in the Real Property Limitation Act, defence counsel referred to other statutory provisions to support his argument that the term “instrument” should be read as being limited to an instrument that affects or relates to an interest in land.  In his submission, the stand-alone guarantees did not fall within the meaning of “instrument” as that term was used in s. 43(1).

[47]           In particular, defence counsel referred to the definition of “instrument” in s. 1 of the Registry Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. R.20, as follows:

“instrument” includes every instrument whereby title to land in Ontario may be transferred, disposed of, charged, encumbered or affected in any other way, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, includes … a deed, conveyance, mortgage, assignment of mortgage, certificate of discharge of mortgage, … a contract in writing, … and every notice, caution and other instrument registered in compliance with an Act of Canada or Ontario;

[48]           Under s. 22 of the Registry Act, any instrument as defined in s. 1 may be registered under that Act, subject to specified exceptions.  As well, under s. 23 of that Act, the land registrar may refuse to accept for registration any instrument that, in the registrar’s opinion, does not affect or relate to an interest in land.  On the same basis, the registrar may refrain from recording part of a registered instrument.  As defence counsel also noted, there is no definition of “instrument” in the Land Titles Act, but s. 81 of that Act is to the same effect as s. 23 of the Registry Act.  Under s. 81 of the Land Titles Act, the land registrar may refuse to register all or part of an instrument on the basis that it does not affect or relate to an interest in land.

[49]           Applying the foregoing legislative provisions, it is clear that only instruments that affect or relate to an interest in land are capable of being registered under the Land Titles Act or the Registry Act.  Registration under those statutes provides public notice relating to ownership and other interests in real property in Ontario, and provides the basis for determining the priority of those interests.  What was not clear to me was why the meaning of instrument for registration purposes was determinative (or even relevant) when interpreting the meaning of that term for purposes of determining the limitation period for court proceedings, as set out in s. 43(1) of the Real Property Limitation Act.

[50]           In any case, plaintiff’s counsel did not dispute that the term “instrument” in s. 43(1) should be interpreted as meaning an instrument that affects or relates to an interest in land.  As explained further below, I agree with plaintiff’s counsel that the stand-alone guarantees are instruments that affect or relate to an interest in land, applying the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Equitable Trust.  As well, by their terms, the stand-alone agreements include covenants “to repay … money secured by a mortgage”, that is, the second mortgages between the plaintiff and the corporate defendants.  Accordingly, I have concluded that the limitation period for the plaintiff’s claim under the stand-alone guarantees was ten years.

This reasoning seems sound to me, but I find the real property limitations scheme as arcane as everyone else.

Ontario: the limitation of applications to recover real estate advances

In Scicluna v. Solstice Two Limited, the Court of Appeal reminds us that an application to recover monies advanced in a real estate purchase is subject to the Real Property Limitations Act:

[25]      Although the application judge should have responded overtly in her decision to Solstice’s limitation period defence, she was clearly correct to reject it. In my view, Yim v. Talon International Inc., 2017 ONCA 267 (CanLII), 137 O.R. (3d) 184 confirms that Ms. Scicluna’s claim is governed by the 10 year limitation period in s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15(“RPLA”), not by the Limitations Act. I reject Solstice’s attempt to distinguish this case based on the factual difference that Yim dealt with a deposit whereas the “forfeited money” claimed by Solstice is no longer a deposit. The RPLA governs actions to recover “land”, and “land” is defined in s. 1 as including “money to be laid out in the purchase of land”. Ms. Scicluna’s application to recover monies advanced in a real estate purchase falls under that definition regardless of whether it is properly characterized as a deposit.al

Ontario: RPLA applies to all claims to obtain land

After a prolonged summer break, Under the Limit returns!

In Waterstone Properties v. Caledon (Town), the Court of Appeal reminds us that s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act applies to any court proceeding to obtain land by court judgment:

[32]      The words “action to recover any land” in s. 4 of the RPLA are not limited to claims for possession of land or to regain something a plaintiff has lost.  Rather, “to recover any land” means simply “to obtain any land by judgment of the Court” and thus these words also encompass claims for a declaration in respect of land and claims to the ownership of land advanced by way of resulting or constructive trust:  Hartman Estate v. Hartfam Holdings Ltd., 2006 CanLII 266 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 69, at para. 56; McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86 (CanLII), 118 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 38-39.

As to what it means to obtain land by court judgment, some direction comes from Justice Faieta’s decision in Wilfert v. McCallum from June 2017.  The prospect that a financial benefit may accrue to a plaintiff/judgment creditor resulting from a declaration to set aside a transfer of land under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act does not result in the the plaintiff obtaining land by court judgment.

[26]           With the greatest of respect for the views expressed by my colleague in Conde v. Ripley, 2015 ONSC 3342 (CanLII) at para. 48, the prospect that a financial benefit may accrue to a plaintiff/judgment creditor resulting from a declaration to set aside the transfer of land under the FCA does not result in the plaintiff “obtaining land by judgment of the Court”.  Accordingly, an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of land is not an action to recover land.

Ontario: claims for the return of condo deposits subject to ten year limitation period

The Court of Appeal has held that a claim for the return of deposits advanced toward the purchase of a condo unit is subject to the ten year limitation period in s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act.

Justice Epstein’s analysis in Harvey v. Talon International Inc. is refreshingly methodical and lucid.  It begins with the governing principle of statutory interpretation:

[40]      This is a matter of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation is governed by the approach described in Elmer Driedger,Construction of Statutes, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1983), at p. 87, and adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Re Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd., 1998 CanLII 837 (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, at para. 21:

Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.

Principles Applied

[41]         Section 4 of the RPLA provides as follows:

No person shall make an entry or distress, or bring an action to recover any land or rent, but within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to some person through whom the person making or bringing it claims, or if the right did not accrue to any person through whom that person claims, then within ten years next after the time at which the right to make such entry or distress, or to bring such action, first accrued to the person making or bringing it.

[42]         When those aspects of s. 4 of the RPLA that do not apply to this case are removed, it provides that:

No person shall bring an action to recover any land, but within ten years after the time at which the right to bring any such action first accrued to the person bringing it

[43]         Thus, there are 3 requirements in s. 4: an “action”, to “recover” and what must be recovered is “land”.

[44]         An action is defined in s. 1 of the RPLA to include “any civil proceeding”.

[45]         “Recover” is defined in legal dictionaries as “gaining through a judgment or order”. This was the definition adopted for the use of “recover” in s. 4 in McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86 (CanLII), 118 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 16-20, specifically, at para. 17, where this Court noted that the English Court of Appeal has held that the expression “to recover any land” in comparable legislation “is not limited to obtaining possession of the land, nor does it mean to regain something that the plaintiff had and lost. Rather, “recover” means to ‘obtain any land by judgment of the Court’”

[46]         I agree with the application judge’s approach on this point. This is clearly an action to recover.

[47]         The remaining question is whether what Ms. Yim seeks to recover – her deposit – is “land”. The definition of land in s. 1 of the RPLA is as follows:

“land” includes messuages and all other hereditaments, whether corporeal or incorporeal, chattels and other personal property transmissible to heirs, money to be laid out in the purchase of land, and any share of the same hereditaments and properties or any of them, any estate of inheritance, or estate for any life or lives, or other estate transmissible to heirs, any possibility, right or title of entry or action, and any other interest capable of being inherited, whether the same estates, possibilities, rights, titles and interest or any of them, are in possession, reversion, remainder or contingency;

[48]         In my view, the application judge was also correct in concluding that an application for the return of the deposit was an action for the recovery of “land”; specifically the recovery of “money to be laid out in the purchase of land”.

[…]

[51]         In support of this conclusion, I note that several cases have clarified the relationship between claims for damages and claims covered by the RPLA. The Supreme Court in Canson Enterprises Ltd. v. Boughton & Co., 1991 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1991] 3 S.C.R. 534, defined damages as “a monetary payment for the invasion of a right at common law”. In Toronto Standard Condominium Corp. No. 1487 v. Market Lofts Inc., 2015 ONSC 1067 (CanLII), the plaintiff sought damages based off the defendant’s failure to meet its obligations under a Shared Services Agreement. Perell J., beginning at para. 49, noted that the fact that real property is incidentally involved in an action does not necessarily mean that the action is governed by the RPLA. Among the cases he cited was Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corp. No. 1067 v. L. Chung Development Co., 2012 ONCA 845 (CanLII). In that case, this Court made the following comment, at para. 7:

Finally, we do not think that the [RPLA] applies to the case as framed by the appellant. In its Statement of Claim, the appellant frames its action as one for damages flowing from the respondents’ negligence, breach of contract, conflict of interest, and breach of duty of care, fiduciary duty and statutory duty. None of these relates to the categories of actions encompassed by the [RPLA].

[52]         Thus, had Ms. Yim’s claim been one primarily seeking damages, for example breach of contract, her application would be statute-barred. This would be true even if the claim for damages incidentally related to real property, specifically the condominium that was the subject of her APS. Claims for damages do not fit within the definition of “land” in the RPLA.

[53]         However, Ms. Yim is not seeking damages. She advances a specific claim under a provision in the Act, a provision that only allows for the return of her deposit and interest, not damages. The Tax Court defined a deposit in Casa Blanca Homes Ltd. v. R., 2013 TCC 338 (CanLII), as “a pool of money retained until such time as it is applied in partial payment or forfeited”. As noted by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Lozcal Holdings Ltd. v. Brassos Development Ltd. (1980), 1980 ABCA 72 (CanLII), 111 D.L.R. (3d) 598, “a genuine deposit ordinarily has nothing to do with damages, except that credit must be given for the amount of the deposit in calculating damages”.

[54]         This leads me to the consideration of “money to be laid out in the purchase of land”, a phrase on which there is scant jurisprudence. However, in my view an action for the return of a deposit fits comfortably within its plain meaning. Frankly, I struggle to understand what would fit within this phrase if not an action such as this.

[55]         On the basis of the foregoing analysis, I conclude that Ms. Yim’s application is not statute-barred. This is also true of the amendment of her initial application to specifically claim statutory rescission. As her application is covered by s. 4 of the RPLA, the applicable limitation period is ten years. The application is an action, which is defined as any civil action. She seeks “recovery”, which has been defined as “gaining through a judgment or order”. And the recovery she seeks is of “land”; namely, her deposit, which is money laid out in the purchase of land.

[56]         I would therefore not give effect to this ground of appeal.

Ontario: The limitation of claims for trusts over real property

Justice Doyle’s decision in Campbell v. Nicol contains a helpful summary of the limitation of claims for the imposition of a constructive trust on real property:

[71]           With respect to equitable claims, the Ontario Court of Appeal dealt with this issue in McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86 (CanLII), 118 O.R. (3d) 561, where the court dealt with a claim for the remedial constructive trust over real property based on an allegation of unjust enrichment. The Court held that the applicable limitation period was the 10 year period under s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act.

[72]           The question for the Court was whether a claim for unjust enrichment in which the claimant asks the court to impose a constructive trust upon the respondent’s real property is an action to recover any land. The Court answered in the affirmative. The Court concluded that the constructive trust remedy for unjust enrichment as well as the purposes and contextual interpretation of the Real Property Limitations Act justified a finding that the claim fell within this category.

[73]           The Court also found that the applicant’s alternative claim for monetary compensation was also governed by the 10-year limitation, not the two-year limitation period pursuant to the Limitations Act, 2002.

Analysis

[74]           The applicant issued his application six years after the date of separation. Given the decision in McConnell, the court finds that the proper limitation period for the claim in unjust enrichment is 10 years under the Real Property Limitations Act.

[75]           A claim based unjust enrichment has two remedies. The Court must first consider a monetary remedy and secondly a property remedy: see Kerr v. Baranow; Vanasse v. Seguin, 2011 SCC 10 (CanLII), [2011] 1 S.C.R. 269.

[76]           Here, the applicant did couch the remedy he was seeking as a property claim for the unjust enrichment claim. The Ontario Court of Appeal in McConnell confirmed that the limitation period for an unjust enrichment claim requesting a property remedy is 10 years. Even though a trial court will, upon finding unjust enrichment, must first determine if the unjust enrichment can first be remedied by a monetary claim as stated in Kerr and Vanasse, the McConnell case states that the claim for unjust enrichment has a limitation period of 10 years even if the alternate claim is for monetary compensation.

 

Ontario: Adverse possession is a limitations issue

Justice McKinnon’s decision in Osman v. Heath sets out nicely the principles of adverse possession.  Perhaps surprisingly to those who don’t practice in the area, these are limitations principles determined by the Real Property Limitations Act.  Here are the relevant paragraphs:

The Law

[49]           The cases on adverse possession are legion and each case turns on its own set of particular facts. In Ontario, adverse possession claims are governed by sections 4, 13, and 15 of the Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15, which establishes a ten-year limitation period in which a dispossessed owner must bring an action to recover possession once a right to possession has accrued. By section 15, when a person has not attempted to recover the land within ten years after the right to bring an action or make entry or distress accrued, the right and title of the owner of the land is extinguished. A person claiming a possessory title as against the legal owner must establish the following:

  1.    Actual possession for the statutory period;
  2.    That such possession was with the intention of excluding the true owner; and
  3.    That the true owner’s possession was effectively excluded for the statutory period: Pflug v. Collins, 1951 CanLII 80 (ON SC), [1952] O.R. 519 (Ont. H.C.); Marotta v. Creative Investments Ltd. (2008), 69 R.P.R. (4th) 44 (Ont. S.C.); Keefer v. Arillotta (1976), 1976 CanLII 571 (ON CA), 13 O.R. (2d) 680 (C.A.).

[50]           The claimant must meet each of these three criteria and time will begin to run against the owner from the last date when all three are satisfied: Masidon Investments Ltd. v. Ham (1984), 1984 CanLII 1877 (ON CA), 45 O.R. (2d) 563 (C.A.).

[51]           Marotta is a particularly helpful decision; it sets out in detail the applicable law, and I shall briefly follow the analysis employed in that decision.

Actual possession

[52]           The claimant must establish actual possession for the ten-year period and the acts of possession must be open, notorious, constant, continuous, adverse and exclusive of the right of the true owner. In Teis v. Ancaster (Town) (1997),1997 CanLII 1688 (ON CA), 35 O.R. (3d) 216 (C.A.), at paras. 14, 16, Laskin J.A. explained the requirement of open and notorious possession in these words:

First, open possession shows that the claimant is using the property as an owner might. Second, open possession puts the true owner on notice that the statutory period had begun to run. Because the doctrine of adverse possession is based on the true owner’s failure to take action within the limitation period, time should not run unless the delay can fairly be held against the owner….

 

The element of adversity means that the claimant is in possession without the permission of the owner. If the claimant acknowledges the right of the true owner then the possession is not adverse.

[…]

[57]           Further, the “inconsistent use” test does not apply to cases of honest unilateral mistake: Cunningham v. Zebarth Estate (1998), 71 O.T.C. 317 (Ont. Gen. Div.). The “inconsistent use” test does not apply in circumstances in which the person in possession operates under the honestly held belief that he or she is the rightful owner of the property or in cases where the legal owner and person in possession operate under a mutual mistake as to title or boundaries. In such cases, an inference may be drawn that the occupier is in possession of the land with the intention of excluding all others including the legal owners.

[…]

Actual exclusion of the true owners

[59]           The final part of the test for possessory title requires that the true owner be excluded from possession. In analyzing this subject, the conduct of the owners in relation to the land is considered.

[60]           As I have stated, the true owners had effectively abandoned the large shed certainly when the business was moved to another location in Kemptville, and probably during the 1980s. When the Doucettes acquired the Residential Property they closed off all entrances to the large shed on the side of the Commercial Property. It was effectively sealed off from access by the true owner. The sealing off was accomplished openly and notoriously. The entire building was raised and leveled, concrete was poured, and work was carried out on the exterior. Photos show Mr. Doucette on a ladder performing renovations to the exterior of the large shed. The true owners had been excluded from the large shed since at least 1990.