Ontario: Court of Appeal on the impact of a forum dispute on a third party claim

Will a third party claim become an appropriate remedy within the meaning of s. 5(1)(a)(iv) only once the court has determined the forum for the main action?  No, held the Court of Appeal in Lilydale Cooperative Limited v. Meyn Canada Inc.  The issues arising from a contested forum, in particular the risk of attornment, are tactical and do not impact on when the claimant discovers the claim.  The court’s analysis is well-reasoned:

[49]      Meyn’s position is that it was not legally appropriate under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act to bring the third party proceedings until the forum issue was finally decided in February 2008 and that the two years ran from that time. Its submission is based on what occurred in the main action where Lilydale took the position by letter dated March 10, 2006 that it would only be proceeding in one jurisdiction, Alberta or Ontario. Meyn did not defend or take any steps in the Ontario action. In its submissions on this appeal, Meyn explained that the reason for this was because it believed that doing so had the potential to undermine its position in support of the stay of the Ontario action.

 [50]      Meyn’s argument regarding discoverability has two prongs. First, it could not deliver any third party claim in the Ontario action to ensure that it did not attorn and thereby jeopardize the forum argument. Second, if it had been successful in establishing that Alberta was the correct forum, then the Ontario action would have been discontinued and there would have been no need for any third party proceedings. Therefore, the principle applies from 407 ETR Concession Co. v. Day2016 ONCA 709133 O.R. (3d) 762, and Presidential MSH Corp. v. Marr, Foster & Co. LLP2017 ONCA 325135 O.R. (3d) 321, that it would not be legally appropriate to commence a legal proceeding while another resolution process that may resolve the matter is ongoing.

[55]      While a finding that serving a third party claim amounted to attornment could be prejudicial, or even fatal to a party’s forum challenge, the strategic decision of how to deal with this risk of prejudice is the type of tactical consideration that does not affect the “legally appropriate” calculus in s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act. The issue of whether serving a third party claim solely to protect a limitation period will amount to voluntary attornment is for the forum judge to decide. It does not affect the discoverability of the third party claim and therefore the commencement of the limitation period.

 [56]      I also note that a party such as Meyn, facing the expiry of a limitation period, had a number of procedural avenues to take to avoid that consequence rather than allow a limitation period to expire or be found to have expired on the application of discoverability principles.
 [57]      First, Meyn could have alerted Weishaupt that the third party claim was coming and sought its agreement under s. 22(3) of the Limitations Act to a stand-still pending the determination of the forum issue. I can see no reason for the third party not to agree. However, if there were one, then judicial authorization on the attornment issue could be sought. That is what occurred in Joyce v. MtGox Inc.2016 ONSC 581, where Perell J., on a case management conference in advance of the expiry of the limitation period, involving a party in Meyn’s position, ruled that issuing the third party claim would not amount to attornment.
 [58]      Second, Meyn could have served the third party claim, with an express reservation of its rights, and then argued at its forum motion that it did so only to preserve the limitation period and therefore has not attorned to Ontario’s jurisdiction. Meyn brought a forum non conveniens motion. It was understood by all the existing parties that Meyn was not acknowledging the convenience of Ontario as the forum for the action by bringing the motion. While that motion was outstanding, it would be anomalous indeed if Meyn’s service of a third party claim to preserve a limitation period in Ontario would be found to amount to such an acknowledgement.
 [59]      To conclude, while risk of attornment was a potentially legitimate concern for Meyn, that concern related to its position on the forum issue and did not affect the discoverability of its third party claim and the need to take the steps necessary to preserve the claim within the limitation period.

The appellant also argued that the forum dispute had the potential to resolve the third party claim, and was therefore an alternative resolution process that could render the third party proceeding inappropriate until its conclusion.  The court rejected this submission.  The forum dispute couldn’t resolve the third party claim, it would only move it to another jurisdiction.

[63]      The forum challenge is conceptually similar to settlement discussions, which may resolve the entire claim so that no court proceeding need be commenced, but nonetheless do not postpone the running of the limitation period: see Presley v. Van Dusen2019 ONCA 66432 D.L.R. (4th) 712, at para. 25; and Markel at para. 34.

[64]      As in RidelTapak v. Non-Marine UnderwritersLloyd’s of London2018 ONCA 16876 C.C.L.I. (5th) 197, leave to appeal refused, [2018] S.C.C.A. No. 157, and Gravelle, in this case, there was no alternative resolution process to which Weishaupt was a party that could have resolved the issue between it and Meyn. Rather, Meyn was attempting to have the whole Ontario action dismissed, obviating the need for the third party claim.

[65]      To allow parties to wait, at their discretion, for other court or arbitral proceedings to conclude, where the result could obviate the need to bring a claim that they know exists, is inconsistent with the purpose of the Limitations Act for two reasons. First, this approach could extend the limitation period well beyond the two year original threshold in an uncertain and unpredictable manner. Second, there were no significant savings to be achieved by not commencing the third party claim until the forum challenge was complete. Procedurally, a stand-still or tolling agreement could be sought until the forum issue had been finalized by the court so that the third party would not be required to plead in response. However, it would be on notice that if the Ontario action proceeds, it is a named party, required to preserve its documents, and respond to the action as advised.
[66]      In my view, these factors drive the conclusion that the day Meyn was served with the statement of claim by Lilydale, it knew that a third party claim against Weishaupt was the appropriate means to seek a remedy from Weishaupt. It was therefore not “legally appropriate” for Meyn to wait until the forum issue had been decided before the commencing third party claim.

Ontario: An insurer’s denial has to be (really) explicit to trigger discovery

The Divisional Court decision in Western Life Assurance Company v. Penttila demonstrates that if an insurer intends for a denial to commence a limitation period for a coverage proceeding, that denial needs to be as explicit as explicit can be.

The insurer, Western, denied its insured Penttila’s claim for LTD benefits in February 2013, and told her that she could appeal the denial within 60 days by written request.  At the same time, Western stated explicitly that it wasn’t waiving its right to rely on any “time limitations”.

Penttila initiated an appeal within the prescribed time.  Western wrote to Penttila in October 2014 that its position “remained unchanged”.  Pentilla didn’t understand this to mean Western had denied her appeal.  She wrote to Western in May 2015 asking about the decision in her appeal.  Western responded in June 2015 by confirming that benefits remained declined.  Penttila commenced a proceeding in June 2016.  Western defended, pleaded a limitations defence, and moved for judgment on it.  The motion judge held that a trial was necessary to determine the defence.

Penttila’s evidence was that she believed Western continued to consider appeal June 2015.  She didn’t understand Western October 2013 correspondence to be determinative of her appeal.

Western appealed. It argued that the Penttila should have known that a proceeding was an appropriate remedy for her loss once it terminated her LTD benefits.

Penttila’s position was that a proceeding wasn’t appropriate as of that date:

[24]           Ms. Penttila takes the position that it was not appropriate for her to file a claim as of March 7, 2013, as her appeal had not yet been finally determined by Western because:

a)   She was told she had a right to appeal provided she took certain steps which she did.  It was therefore not clear that the process had run its course;

 b)   There was no denial of the appeal or any reason to believe that the matter would not be amicably resolved;

 c)   She was not represented by legal counsel;

 d)   There was no clear reference to the fact that the limitation period was running in the communications from the insurer.  The insurer said only that “the limit”, whatever it was, was not being waived;

 e)   She made concessions and repaid monies paid pursuant to her CPP disability setoff, believing that she was engaging in an attempt at dispute resolution.  This was done at the request of the insurer;

 f)     There was no reason for her to do this except to attempt to resolve the claim instead of litigating; and

 g)   There is no suggestion that the delay was a tactical decision to delay the proceeding.

[25]           Moreover, the courts have recognized that there is a clear policy objective to encourage parties to resolve matters instead of going directly to litigation.  Waiting for the appeal to be determined is consistent with that important policy objective.

The Divisional Court rejected Western’s argument:

[50]           For the reasons set out herein, we find that the motion judge was correct to hold that the triggering event for the commencement of the two-year limitation period was the date upon which it would be legally appropriate to commence legal proceedings to seek payment of long-term disability benefits that the insurer refused to pay.

[51]           We further find that the motion judge made no palpable and overriding error in dismissing the motion for summary judgment on the basis that Western had not established that the claim was statute-barred.  We come to this conclusion for the following reasons:

(i)                 Right of Appeal

[52]           Before March 7, 2013, Ms. Penttila was advised that as of March 7, her benefits would no longer be paid by the insurer but that, “you may appeal this claim decision by sending your written request for review to our office within 60 days from the date of this letter.”

[53]           On April 8, 2013, Ms. Penttila advised that, “I wish to appeal this claim.”

[54]           On November 13, 2013, Western wrote her to advise that: “[u]pon receipt of all the above requested information, we will complete our review of your appeal and advise you of the decision.”

[55]           Ms. Penttila thereby accepted a clear offer to allow her to appeal the denial of her claim for benefits.  A process was established, and her appeal was determined by the insurer.  She was advised by letter dated October 21, 2014, of the decision that her appeal had been rejected.  (Ms. Penttila says she did not receive written confirmation until June 15, 2015.)

[56]           The right to appeal was not simply part of an insurer’s general obligation to accept any material; it was a specific and agreed right of appeal, a clear articulation of the process to be followed, and a specific decision in respect of the appeal.

[57]           A reasonable person in Ms. Penttila’s position would have pursued her right of appeal.  Until that process ran its course, it would be premature to commence legal proceedings against the insurer.

(ii)               No Need to Review the Tone and Tenor of Discussions

[58]           The court was not required to assess the “tone and tenor” of communications between the parties as there was a clear beginning and end to the process.  Western told Ms. Penttila that she had a right to appeal and that a decision would be rendered, and it was.

(iii)            No Litigation Counsel Engaged

[59]           Ms. Penttila did not retain counsel while the appeal was ongoing. This fact does not “[belie] any suggestion of a lack of awareness of the appropriateness of commencing a lawsuit at that point in time”: Pepper, at para. 1.

[60]           The words “in offering to review additional evidence we are not waiving our right to rely on any statutory or policy provisions including any time limitations”, in this factual context, were not sufficiently clear to demonstrate to Ms. Penttila that the insurer intended to rely on the fact that the limitation period was running before the appeal had been decided.

(iv)            Ms. Penttila’s Evidence as to Her Belief

[61]           On the contrary, Ms. Penttila’s uncontradicted sworn evidence was that she at all times believed that, from the time the initial benefits were denied (in the letter dated February 19, 2013), to the time she received the final decision on appeal, Western was considering her appeal.

[62]           This belief is supported by the fact that, on November 13, 2013, Western advised that: “[u]pon receipt of all the above requested information, we will complete our review of your appeal and advise you of the decision.”  There was no statement in respect of time limitations.

[63]           Lastly, unlike Nasr, Ms. Penttila never conceded that the insurer never told her that it would not be relying on a limitations defence.

(v)               No Tactical Delay

[64]           Ms. Penttila made good faith efforts to avoid unnecessary litigation believing Western was considering her appeal. There is no suggestion that Ms. Penttila engaged in a tactical delay of the proceeding.

(vi)            Meets the Policy Objectives

[65]           The motion judge’s decision is consistent with the policy objective of avoiding unnecessary litigation and discouraging parties from rushing to litigation, provided there is no tactical delay.

The court also provided a good summary of the principles for assessing the appropriateness of a proceeding against an insurer:

[35]           In assessing when it is legally “appropriate” to bring a proceeding within the meaning of s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the courts have articulated the following guidelines:

a)      The determination of whether legal action is “legally appropriate” takes into account what a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the plaintiff ought to have known: Presidential, at para. 18.

b)      Parties should be discouraged from rushing to litigation or arbitration.  Rather, they should be encouraged to resolve claims as courts take a dim view of unnecessary litigation: Markel Insurance Company of Canada v. ING Insurance Company of Canada2012 ONCA 218 (CanLII)109 O.R. (3d) 652, at para. 34; and 407 ETR, at para. 48.

c)      It is premature for a party to bring a court proceeding to seek a remedy if a statutory dispute resolution process offers an adequate alternative remedy and that process has not fully run its course or been exhaustive: Volochay v. College of Massage Therapists of Ontario2012 ONCA 541 (CanLII)111 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 61-70.

d)      However, where the insurer has been clear that it intends to rely on the limitation period, and the claim has “ripened”, the court should be wary of getting involved in assessing the “tone and tenor of communications” to determine where and when there was a denial of the claim by the insurer as this would inject an undesirable element of uncertainty into the law of limitation of actions: Markel, at para. 34.

e)      The courts should also be wary of allowing a party to delay the commencement of proceedings simply for tactical reasons: 407ETR, at para. 47; and Markel, at para. 34.

f)        It is appropriate for the court to consider what was communicated to the insured and whether the claim was clearly and unequivocally denied: Kassburg v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada2014 ONCA 922 (CanLII)124 O.R. (3d) 171, at para. 42.

g)      The courts have specifically recognized two circumstances in which the issue of “appropriate means” may delay the date on which a claim was discovered.

•         First, where the insured relies on the superior knowledge and expertise of the insurer, especially where the insurer made efforts to ameliorate the loss.

•         Second, where other proceedings remain ongoing (such as criminal proceedings or arbitration): Presidential, at paras. 28-48.

h)      Where an insured seeks to preclude an insurer from relying on a limitations defence on the basis of promissory estoppel, the insurer’s conduct must amount to a promise on which the insured acted to its detriment: Maracle v. Travellers Indemnity Co. of Canada, 1991 CanLII 58 (SCC)[1991] 2 S.C.R. 50; and Marchischuk v. Dominion Industrial Supplies Ltd., 1991 CanLII 59 (SCC)[1991] 2 S.C.R. 61.

 

Ontario: the defendant’s inability to satisfy a debt doesn’t make a proceeding inappropriate

 

Davies v. Davies Smith Developments Partnership is another decision from the Court of Appeal that delineates when a proceeding will be an appropriate remedy for a plaintiff’s loss.  The defendant’s lack of funds to satisfy its debt to the plaintiff did not prevent a claim from being an appropriate remedy for the debt.  The decision also reiterates the distinction between damage and damages:

[11]      In asserting that the limitation period had not expired, the appellant submits that: (a) the amount owing to the appellant was in dispute; (b) the profits could not be ascertained until the partnership’s projects had been completed; (c) an action was not an “appropriate” means to remedy the appellant’s loss because he knew the partnership did not have funds; and (d) there had been forbearance or novation, making it inappropriate to commence an action. The appellant submits that the claim was not discovered until 2011, when he realized that the respondent had made improper charges to his capital account.

[12]      We agree with the respondent that the first two submissions confuse “damage” with “damages”. The appellant knew by the end of June 2008 that he had suffered damage, even though the amount of his damages was a matter of dispute and had not been quantified: see Hamilton (City) v. Metcalfe & Mansfield Capital Corporation2012 ONCA 156 (CanLII)347 D.L.R. (4th) 657, at paras. 54 and 58.

[13]      The third submission that the respondent did not have the funds to pay, while perhaps explaining the appellant’s conduct, did not stop the limitation period from running. The appellant’s claim was “fully ripened” by July 2008. The word “appropriate”, as it appears in s. 5 of the Limitations Act, means “legally appropriate”. The appellant cannot rely on his own tactical reasons for delaying the commencement of legal proceedings: see Markel Insurance Company of Canada v. ING Insurance Company of Canada2012 ONCA 218 (CanLII)348 D.L.R. (4th) 744, at para. 34.

Ontario: s. 5(1)(a)(iv) and doctor-patient relationships

The decision in Kram v. Oestreicher is an example of a circumstance where a proceeding did not become an appropriate remedy while a doctor was attempting to remedy his error:

[125]      In my view, the circumstances here are analogous to those before the Court of Appeal in both Presidential MSH Corporation and Brown v. Baum. Assuming that I had concluded that Oestreicher was civilly liable for the manner in which the June 15, 2009 surgery was carried out, he was engaged in good faith efforts to remedy any damage caused for at least the next 14 months. This was reflected in the three subsequent surgeries he performed, the last of which occurred on August 17, 2010. Moreover, it is clear that Kram was relying on Oestreicher’s superior knowledge and expertise throughout this time period.

[126]      In my view, it would have been premature, and therefore inappropriate, for Kram to have commenced a legal action while Oestreicher’s good-faith efforts to remedy any negative effects from the June 15, 2009 surgery were ongoing. I conclude that the two-year limitation period in respect of her claims began to run, at the earliest, on August 17, 2010. She commenced this proceeding within two years of that date. Accordingly, Kram’s claims are not barred by the operation of the Act.

 

Ontario: the CA on the impact of related criminal proceedings on the limitation of intentional torts

In Winmill v. Woodstock (Police Services Board), the Court of Appeal considered the appropriateness of a proceeding as a remedy to battery.  The decision is generally noteworthy for the quality of its s. 5(1)(a)(iv) analysis, but also of its application of s. 5 to the interaction between claims arising from intentional torts and related to criminal proceedings.  As the court’s dissent notes, the limitation of these claims is usually determined by the misapplication of common law principles, not s. 5.

The plaintiff sued the Woodstock police for negligent investigation and battery.  The police obtained summary judgment dismissing the claim arising from the battery as statute-barred, but not the claim arising from negligent investigation.  The plaintiff appealed successfully.

Justice MacPherson and Feldman undertook a refreshingly comprehensive and sound s. 5 analysis:

[18]      Turning to s. 5(1)(a) of the LA, in this case there is no issue with respect to the first three of the four factors set out in this clause. The appellant knew that he had been injured on June 1, 2014, that the injury was caused by physical blows to his body, and that at least some of the respondents administered those blows.

[19]      The crucial issue is the fourth factor: did the appellant know on June 1, 2016 that a legal proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy the injuries caused by the alleged battery committed against him?

The court summarised the principles of applicable to s. 5(1)(a)(iv) analyses:

[22]      First, the word “appropriate” means “legally appropriate”.

[…]

[23]      Second, this does not mean that determining whether a limitation period applies involves pulling two simple levers – date of injury and date of initiation of legal proceeding – and seeing whether the result is inside or outside the limitation period prescribed by the relevant statute. On the contrary, other important factors can come into play in the analysis.

[…]

[24]      Third, within the rubric of “the specific factual or statutory setting of each individual case”, s. 5(1)(b) of the LA requires that attention be paid to the abilities and circumstances of the person with the claim […]

Those principles applied to the plaintiff’s claim meant it was timely:

[25]      Against this background of general principles, I turn to the motion judge’s conclusion that the appellant’s battery claim was outside (by one day) the two year limitation period prescribed by s. 4 of the LA. With respect, I think that the motion judge erred, essentially for three reasons.

[26]      First, the appellant’s negligent investigation claim is proceeding. The parties agree that the discoverability date for this claim is February 17, 2016, the day the appellant was acquitted on the criminal charges against him. Factually, the negligent investigation claim covers almost precisely the same parties and events as the battery claim. There was virtually no investigation in this case. The police were called, they arrived and immediately entered the appellant’s home, and some kind of altercation quickly unfolded.

[27]      In my view, the appellant’s Amended Statement of Claim shows how inextricably intertwined are the two alleged torts:

14 e.  The Defendant officers were present and knew or ought to have known that the Plaintiff did not commit an assault against any police officer. There was no reasonable cause for the Defendant officers to arrest or charge the Plaintiff with assault of a police officer.

14 f.   As the Plaintiff stood motionless, he was pushed violently in the chest by the Defendant Dopf. He was then thrown to the floor. Knee strikes and punches were then delivered by both the Defendants Dopf and Campbell. He was handcuffed, removed from the house and taken to the police station.

[28]      Second, I agree with the appellant that, in the specific factual setting of this case (407 ETR), and bearing in mind the circumstances of the person with the claim (Novak), it made sense for him to postpose deciding whether to make a battery claim against the respondents until his criminal charges for assault and resisting arrest were resolved. The criminal charges of assault and resisting arrest against the appellant and his tort claim of battery against the respondents are, in reality, two sides of the same coin or mirror images of each other.

[…]

[31]      In a similar vein, it strikes me as obvious that the verdict in the appellant’s criminal trial, especially on the assault charge, would be a crucial, bordering on determinative, factor in the appellant’s calculation of whether to proceed with a civil action grounded in a battery claim against the respondents.

[32]      Third, and overlapping with the second reason, there is a case almost directly on point suggesting that the appellant was justified in waiting for the verdict in his criminal trial before commencing a civil claim against the respondents. In Chimienti v. Windsor (City)2011 ONCA 16 (CanLII), the plaintiff was charged with assault following a tavern brawl. The charge was dropped. The plaintiff commenced a civil action with claims of negligent and malicious investigation. The motion judge dismissed the action on the basis of the relevant statutory limitation period. This court, although dismissing the appeal on other grounds, disagreed with the motion judge’s analysis of the discoverability issue. In doing so, the court said, at para. 15:

[T]here is something of a logical inconsistency in asking a civil court to rule on the propriety of a criminal prosecution before the criminal court has had the opportunity to assess the merits of the underlying charge.

[33]      In my view, this passage is particularly applicable to this appeal. As I said earlier, the criminal charges of assault and resisting arrest against the appellant and his tort claim of battery against the respondents are very close to being two sides of the same coin or mirror images of each other. Accordingly, it made sense for the appellant to focus on his criminal charges and deal with those before making a final decision about a civil action against the respondents.

Justice Hourigan dissented:

[40]      In my view, the decision of this court in Markel Insurance Company of Canada v. ING Insurance Company2012 ONCA 218(CanLII)109 O.R. (3d) 652, is key to the correct outcome in this case. In that case, Sharpe J.A. explained that “appropriate” under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Act must mean “legally appropriate”, and, at para. 34, admonished against giving the term a broad meaning:

To give “appropriate” an evaluative gloss, allowing a party to delay the commencement of proceedings for some tactical or other reason beyond two years from the date the claim is fully ripened … would, in my opinion, inject an unacceptable element of uncertainty into the law of limitation of actions.

[41]      My colleague acknowledges the authority of Markel, but in my view undermines it by emphasizing the need to attend to the factual circumstances of individual cases, drawing on this court’s subsequent decisions in 407 ETR Concession Co. v. Day2016 ONCA 709 (CanLII)133 O.R. (3d) 762, and Brown v. Baum2016 ONCA 325 (CanLII)397 D.L.R. (4th) 161. But both of these cases are clearly distinguishable. An action in 407 ETR was not “appropriate” at the time of the injury because an alternative administrative means of settling the dispute had not been completed. An action in Brown was not “appropriate” at the time of the injury because the defendant surgeon was providing further treatment in an attempt to rectify the harm he was alleged to have caused in the initial surgery.

[42]      There was no alternative means of resolving the appellant’s allegations in this case, nor were the defendants in a position to rectify the harm they were alleged to have caused. My colleague considers it obvious that the appellant should await the outcome of the criminal proceedings against him, relying on dicta from Chimienti v. Windsor (City)2011 ONCA 16 (CanLII)330 D.L.R. (4th) 148. But that case, too, is distinguishable, among other reasons because it concerned claims of negligent and malicious investigation – claims that depended on the completion of the relevant criminal proceedings on which they were based.

[…]

[44]      Nor can a claimant delay the start of a limitation period for an intentional tort in order to await the outcome of related criminal proceedings. This approach has been followed by Ontario trial courts in many cases. For example, in Brown v. Becks2017 ONSC 4218 (CanLII), the court held that a limitation period involving various claims against police including battery during an arrest ran from the date of the plaintiff’s arrest, not the date of his acquittal on criminal charges; in Boyce v. Toronto (City) Police Services Board2011 ONSC 54 (CanLII), aff’d 2012 ONCA 230 (CanLII), the limitation period in a civil action against police ran from the date of the battery rather than the officers’ conviction on assault charges. See also EBF v. HMQ in Right of Ontario, et. al2013 ONSC 2581 (CanLII), and Wong v. Toronto Police Services Board2009 CanLII 66385 (ON SC)2009 CarswellOnt 7412 (Ont. S.C.). Similarly, in Kolosov v. Lowe’s Companies Inc.2016 ONCA 973 (CanLII)34 C.C.L.T. (4th) 177, this court affirmed the trial judge’s decision that a limitation period involving intentional tortious conduct alleged to have occurred on arrest ran from the date of the arrest rather than the date of the withdrawal of the criminal charges. See also Roda v. Toronto Police Services Board2016 ONSC 743 (CanLII), aff’d 2017 ONCA 768 (CanLII). My colleague offers no reason to depart from this body of law.

I disagree with this reasoning particularly in regards of the jurisprudence holding that the limitation period commence always on a certain date, like the date of an arrest.  That jurisprudence misapplies common law principles of cause of action accrual to the Limitations Act’s discovery provisions.  As I have discussed many times [cite], it is not the case under the Limitations Act that all plaintiffs will discover a claim always on the happening of a particular event, like an arrest.

Lastly, I noted that the court cited its decision in West for the principle different limitation periods may apply to different torts:

[17]      I begin with a structural point. In a single case where a plaintiff alleges different torts, it is possible and permissible for different limitation periods to apply to the different torts: see West v. Ontario2015 ONCA 147 (CanLII), at paras. 2-3.

It’s not clear to me how there could be any uncertainty about this point.  The Limitations Act applies to “claims” pursued in court proceedings, that is, claims to remedy damage resulting from an act or omission.  There can only be one act or omission in a claim.  Discrete acts or omissions give rise to discrete claims.  A court may define an act expansively, so that, for example, one act of deceit is comprised of multiple unlawful acts, but an act could never be the actionable conduct in deceit and, say, negligent misrepresentation.  This applies equally to claims where the actionable conduct doesn’t sound in tort.

Ontario: undertaking alternative remedial processes can delay discovery

Presidential MSH Corporation v. Marr Foster & Co. LLP is another excellent decision from the Court of Appeal applying s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act.  Where the plaintiff relies on an alternative process that would substantially eliminate its loss so that court proceedings would be unnecessary to remedy it, and the date the alternative process runs its course is reasonably ascertainable, a proceeding will not be an appropriate remedy until that alternative process concludes.

While this decision doesn’t break new ground, it clarifies the impact remedial measures can have on discovery of a claim.  This is of particular consequence in professional negligence claims, which was the case in Presidential.

The respondents filed the appellant’s corporate tax returns after their due date. As a result, the CRA denied tax credits that would have been available had the returns been filed on time.

The appellant received the CRA’s Notices of Assessment disallowing each of the claimed credits on April 12, 2010. When the appellant received the notices, he immediately asked the respodnents what to do and how to fix the problem.

The motion judge inferred that the respondents advised the appellant to retain a tax lawyer to determine how to solve the tax problem but didn’t advise him to obtain legal advice about a professional negligence claim against the respondents.

The appellant did retain a tax lawyer on April 15, 2010, but there was no discussion of a possible action against the respondents. The tax lawyer filed a Notice of Objection to the CRA assessments, as well as an application for discretionary relief. The respondent helped the appellant prepare its appeals to the CRA by drafting the application for relief and helping the appellant and its lawyer with whatever else they needed, until at least November 2011.

By letter dated May 16, 2011, the CRA responded to the Notice of Objection advising that it intended to confirm the assessments. It did in fact confirm them on July 7, 2011.

The motion judge found that, as late as July 2011, there was still a reasonable chance that the application for discretionary relief would mitigate some or all of the appellant’s loss.

On August 1, 2012, the appellant issued its statement of claim against the respondents. This was more than two years after the initial denial by CRA of the credits, but within two years of CRA’s refusal to alter the assessments in response to the Notice of Objection.

The motion judge held that the appellants claim would have been appropriate while the CRA appeal was still ongoing because the appeal would not have fully eliminated the appellant’s claim against the respondents.  In particular, it would not have eliminated the appellant’s claim for the costs of retaining a tax lawyer to prosecute it.

Justice Pardu rejected this reasoning.  She summarised the applicable principles:

[20]      First, the cases suggest that a legal proceeding against an expert professional may not be appropriate if the claim arose out of the professional’s alleged wrongdoing but may be resolved by the professional himself or herself without recourse to the courts, rendering the proceeding unnecessary.

[…]

[26]      Resort to legal action may be “inappropriate” in cases where the plaintiff is relying on the superior knowledge and expertise of the defendant, which often, although not exclusively, occurs in a professional relationship. Conversely, the mere existence of such a relationship may not be enough to render legal proceedings inappropriate, particularly where the defendant, to the knowledge of the plaintiff, is not engaged in good faith efforts to right the wrong it caused. The defendant’s ameliorative efforts and the plaintiff’s reasonable reliance on such efforts to remedy its loss are what may render the proceeding premature.

[27]      Finally, I note that cases in which a defendant who is an expert professional attempts to remedy a loss that a plaintiff has discovered and alleges was caused by the defendant (engaging the potential application of s. 5(1)(a)(iv)) are distinct from  cases in which courts have held that  a client has not discovered a potential claim for solicitor’s negligence until being advised by another legal professional about the claim: see Ferrara, at para. 70; and Lauesen v. Silverman, 2016 ONCA 327 (CanLII), 130 O.R. (3d) 665, at paras. 25-31. In the latter category of cases, the issue is whether the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have knowninjury, loss or damage had occurred (under s. 5(1)(a)(i)) that was caused by or contributed to by an act or omission of the defendant (under ss. 5(1)(a)(ii) and (iii)). Section 5(1)(a)(iv) comes into focus where the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known of his or her loss and the defendant’s causal act or omission, but the plaintiff contends the limitation period was suspended because a proceeding would be premature. Although discoverability under more than one subsection of s. 5(1)(a) may be engaged in a single case, it is important not to collapse the analysis of discoverability of loss or damage and the defendant’s negligence or other wrong with the determination whether legal action is appropriate although other proceedings to deal with the loss may be relevant to both questions.

(3)         The effect of other processes which may eliminate the loss

[28]      A second line of cases interpreting and applying s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Act involves a plaintiff’s pursuit of other processes having the potential to resolve the dispute between the parties and eliminate the plaintiff’s loss.

[29]      This approach to discoverability is consistent with  the rule in administrative law that it is premature for a party to bring a court proceeding to seek a remedy if a statutory dispute resolution process offers an adequate alternative remedy and that process has not fully run its course or been exhausted: see Volochay v. College of Massage Therapists of Ontario, 2012 ONCA 541 (CanLII), 111 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 61-70.

[…]

[39]      Non-administrative, alternative processes have also been seen in other cases as having the potential to resolve a dispute, thus rendering a court proceeding inappropriate or unnecessary.

[…]

[45]      Many of the cases dealing with the effect of alternative processes on the appropriateness of a court proceeding have applied the concept of a proceeding being “legally appropriate” articulated by this court in Markel. Markel involved a dispute between sophisticated insurers claiming indemnity under statutory loss transfer rules. The limitations issue that arose concerned whether a legal proceeding was “inappropriate” while settlement discussions between the parties were ongoing and thus, whether a claim was not discovered until these negotiations broke down.

[46]      Recall that, in Markel, the court held that the term “appropriate” in s. 5(1)(a)(iv) means “legally appropriate”. This interpretation avoided entangling courts in the task of having to “assess [the] tone and tenor of communications in search of a clear denial” that would indicate the breakdown of negotiations between the parties. That would permit a plaintiff to delay the discoverability of a claim for “some tactical or other reason” and “inject an unacceptable element of uncertainty into the law of limitation of actions” (at para. 34).

[47]      Similarly, in 407 ETR Concession Company, at para. 47, Laskin J.A. stated that the use of the term “legally appropriate” inMarkel “signified that a plaintiff could not claim it was appropriate to delay the start of the limitation period for tactical reasons, or in circumstances that would later require the court to decide when settlement discussions had become fruitless” (emphasis added).

[48]      These cases instruct that if a plaintiff relies on the exhaustion of some alternative process, such as an administrative or other process, as suspending the discovery of  its claim, the date on which that alternative process has run its course or is exhausted must be reasonably certain or ascertainable by a court.

Accordingly, the motion judge erred in holding that the appellant knew or ought to have known that its proceeding was appropriate as early as April 2010, when it received the CRA’s Notices of Assessment disallowing its tax credits. The proceeding was not appropriate, and the appellant’s underlying claim was not discovered, until May 2011, when the CRA responded to the appellant’s Notice of Objection and advised that it intended to confirm its initial assessments. The motion judge erred by equating knowledge that the respondents had caused a loss with a conclusion that a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek a remedy for the loss.

Had the respondents together with the tax lawyer prosecuted the CRA appeal successfully, the appellant’s loss would have been substantially eliminated, and it would have been unnecessary to resort to court proceedings to remedy it. The fact that the appellant would have been unable to recover the fees it paid the tax lawyer, except through litigation, was inconsequential. It is the claim that is discoverable, not the full extent of damages the plaintiff may be able to recover. It would not have been appropriate under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Act for the appellant to commence a proceeding until the respondents ameliorative efforts concluded.

The CRA appeal process had the potential to eliminate the appellant’s loss. As an alternative process to court proceedings, it could have resolved the dispute between the appellant and the respondents. These results would have made a proceeding unnecessary. It would not have been appropriate for the appellant to commence a proceeding until the CRA appeal process was exhausted in May 2011.

The court’s decision in Markel, as interpreted in 407 ETR Concession Company, about the meaning of the concept of a proceeding being “legally appropriate” under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Act supported the appellant’s position. It was not a case where the appellant sought to toll the operation of the limitation period by relying on the continuation of an alternative process whose end date was uncertain or not reasonably ascertainable. It was clear that the end date of the CRA appeal was when the CRA responded to the appellant’s Notice of Objection advising that it intended to confirm the assessments. Thus the motion judge erred in invoking Markel to dismiss the appellant’s claim as time barred.

A last note: the Court of Appeal seems to still be ignoring its decision in Clarke where it held that  the section 5(1)(a)(iv) discovery criterion requires the claimant to have “good reason to believe he or she has a legal claim for damages”.  I don’t think any decision has followed this construction of the provision.

Ontario: Highways are still subject to limitation periods

The Court of Appeal allowed the 407’s appeal of Justice Edward’s decision in 407 ETR Concession Company Limited v. Day.  Apart from settling the great question of how the passage of time limits 407’s claims for unpaid tolls, Justice Laskin’s decision suggests a maturity in s. 5(1)(a)(iv) jurisprudence.

 The circumstances of the claim are rather bewildering.  The defendant Day, a person of some means, refused to pay the approximately $13,000 plus interest he owed 407 for unpaid tolls.  407 sued him.  Day pleaded a limitations defence, and  407 brought a r. 21 motion to resolve questions of limitations law.  Justice Edwards determined when 407 discovered its claims against Day and rejected the validity of an agreement between Day and 407 extending the limitation period.  407 appealed.

Facts

Some facts are necessary to understand the limitations issue.

407 can collect its unpaid tolls by civil action in the courts or by license plate denial.  The statutory authorization for these two methods is set out in the Highway 407 Act, 1998.

When a person drives a vehicle on the 407, s. 13(1) of the 407 Act provides that the person in whose name the vehicle’s license plate is registered is liable to pay the tolls and related charges.

Sections 15(1) and (2) of the 407 Act provide that tolls are due and payable on the day 407 sends a toll invoice, and that interest begins to accrue 35 days later.  Section 15(3) provides the 407 with a cause of action for nonpayment .

407 can also initiate a license plate denial.  Under s. 16(1) of the 407 Act, if a toll isn’t paid within 35 days after 407 sends an invoice, 407 may send the person responsible for payment a notice of failure to pay.  If the debt remains unpaid 90 days later, s. 22(1) of the 407 Act entitles 407 to notify the Registrar of Motor Vehicles of the failure.  This notice puts the defaulting debtor into license plate denial.  Section 22(3) requires 407 to inform the recipient of a notice sent under s. 16(1) that 407 has given notice to the Registrar.

Once 407 notifies the Registrar, s. 22(4) provides that the Registrar must refuse to validate the vehicle permit issued to the recipient of the s. 16 notice at its next opportunity, and refuse to issue a vehicle permit to that person.  The Registrar’s next opportunity is typically the date the validation for a vehicle permit expires and must be renewed.  The Vehicle Permits Regulation under the Highway Traffic Act  provides that the maximum validation period for a vehicle permit is two years.

Lastly, s. 25 of the 407 Act provides that license plate denial is a complementary rather than exclusive remedy.

The r. 21 motion

407 raised two issues on the motion.

The first issue was the discovery of 407’s claim.  Justice Edwards held that 407 discovered its claim on the earliest date under the 407 Act that it could have notified the Registrar to put Day into license plate denial.

The second issue was the enforceability of the 15-year limitation period in Day’s transponder lease agreement with 407.  Justice Edwards held that 407 could not rely on s. 22 of the Limitations Act, which permits parties to contract out of the basic limitation period, because the lease agreement was not a “business agreement” as defined by that section.

The Court of Appeal’s analysis

Discovery of 407’s claim turned on s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act: when, having regard to the nature of the loss, a proceeding would be an appropriate means to seek to remedy it.

Assessing the date when a civil action became an appropriate means for 407 to recover its loss required considering the purpose of s. 5(1)(a)(iv) in the context of the statutory regime under which 407 operates.

To give effect to the legislature’s intent in the 407 Act, the limitation period must be tied to the license plate denial process: ” The legislature enacted that process for a reason: it was not content to force 407 ETR to sue in the courts for unpaid toll debts. I fully agree with the Divisional Court that licence plate denial is an effective, necessary and indeed integral feature of an open access toll highway. Tying the start date of the limitation period to the licence plate denial process acknowledges the significance the legislature attached to that process for the collection of unpaid tolls.”

A civil action becomes appropriate when 407 has reason to believe that it will not otherwise be paid.  This is when the usually effective license plate denial process runs its course.  This happens when a vehicle permit expires for failure to a pay a toll debt; thereafter, a claim becomes an appropriate remedy to recover the debt and the limitation period commences.

Justice Laskin cited four reasons in support of this conclusion.

[40]      First, under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the date a proceeding would be an appropriate means to recover a loss must have “regard to the nature of the … loss”. So, in fixing the appropriate date, it may not be enough that the loss exists and the claim is actionable. If the claim is the kind of claim that can be remedied by another and more effective method provided for in the statute, then a civil action will not be appropriate until that other method has been used. Here, a claim will not be appropriate until 407 ETR has used that other method, without success.

[41]      […] licence plate denial – is far more effective than a civil action. By providing for licence plate denial, the legislature must be taken to have recognized its effectiveness. People who cannot renew their vehicle permits until they deal with their toll debts have a powerful incentive to pay.

[42]      The statistical evidence bears out the effectiveness of licence plate denial. 407 ETR issues over one million invoices a month. Nearly 70 per cent of those invoices are paid within one month, which means just over 30 per cent are not. Significantly, about 75 per cent of permit holders in default pay their toll debts after being advised the Registrar has sent a s. 22 notice. Of those, just over one half pay before or on the date their vehicle permits have to be renewed; the remainder pay after their vehicle permits have expired.

[43]      These statistics show that the motion judge’s start date – the delivery of a s. 22 notice to the Registrar – is too early in the process. It comes at the beginning of the process instead of where I think it should come, at the end. The licence plate denial process should be allowed to run its course. As the statistics show, most people, fearing the consequences, eventually pay after receiving a s. 22 notice. Only if the process fails to prompt payment does litigation become an appropriate means to recover the debt.

[44]      Second, in determining when a claim ought to have been discovered, s. 5(1)(b) of the Limitations Act, 2002 requires the court to take account of “the circumstances of the person with the claim”. 407 ETR’s “circumstances” differ from those of many other creditors. Highway 407 itself is enormously busy: 380,000 trips on an average workday. As a consequence, 407 ETR must process an enormous number of invoices, almost all for amounts of no more than a few hundred dollars apiece. And unlike, for example a credit card company, which can cancel a customer’s credit card for non-payment of a debt, 407 ETR cannot bar a defaulting debtor’s access to the highway.

[45]      407 ETR’s “circumstances” strongly suggest that requiring it to sue before finding out whether licence plate denial has achieved its purpose would be inappropriate. An important case on the significance of a plaintiff’s “circumstances” is the majority judgment in Novak v. Bond, 1999 CanLII 685 (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 808. In that case, McLachlin J. considered s. 6(4)(b) of British Columbia’s Limitations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 266, which provided that time did not begin to run against a plaintiff until “the person whose means of knowledge is in question ought, in the person’s own interests and taking the person’s circumstances into account, to be able to bring an action” […].

[46]      […] holding that time begins to run against 407 ETR before it knows whether licence plate denial has prompted payment would be unfair, or to use the word of our statute, would not be “appropriate”.

[47]      Holding that the two-year period begins after the licence plate denial process fails to prompt payment does not raise the concern Sharpe J.A. referred to in Markel Insurance Co. of Canada v. ING Insurance Co. of Canada2012 ONCA 218 (CanLII),109 O.R. (3d) 652, at para. 34. There, he said that “appropriate” must mean “legally appropriate”. By using that phrase he signified that a plaintiff could not claim it was appropriate to delay the start of the limitation period for tactical reasons, or in circumstances that would later require the court to decide when settlement discussions had become fruitless. In this case, however, 407 ETR seeks to delay the start of the limitation period for a legally appropriate reason: waiting until a statutorily authorized process has been completed.

[48]      A third consideration is what I take to be an important purpose of s. 5(1)(a)(iv). The overall purposes of limitation statutes are well-established and well-known: certainty, finality and the unfairness of subjecting defendants to the threat of a lawsuit beyond a reasonable period of time. But it seems to me one reason why the legislature added “appropriate means” as an element of discoverability was to enable courts to function more efficiently by deterring needless litigation. As my colleague Juriansz J.A. noted in his dissenting reasons in Hare v. Hare (2006), 2006 CanLII 41650 (ON CA), 83 O.R. (3d) 766 (C.A.), at para. 87, courts take a dim view of unnecessary litigation.

[49]      If the limitation period runs concurrently with the licence plate denial process, as would be the case under the motion judge’s start date, then there would be the real possibility of numerous Small Claims Court claims. And these claims would be needless because the vast majority of defendants would likely pay their debts to avoid having their vehicle permits expire. […]

[51]      Finally, although 407 ETR has discretion when and even whether to send a s. 22 notice to the Registrar, that discretion does not detract from the appropriateness of using the end of the licence plate denial process as the start of the two-year limitation period. In theory, I suppose, as Mr. Day contends, 407 ETR could use its discretion to manipulate the start date. But why, one may ask rhetorically, would it do so? Its commercial interests dictate otherwise.

Justice Laskin also overturned Justice Edwards’s decision on the second limitations issue: whether the lease agreement could extend the applicable limitation period.  Justice Edwards correctly found that the lease agreement was not a business agreement.  However, under s. 22(3) of the Limitations Act, parties can agree to contract out of the basic limitation period even in the absence of a business agreement:

[62]      Under s. 22(3), parties can only suspend or extend the two-year limitation period. Under s. 22(5), parties may vary or exclude altogether the two-year period. Importantly, in s. 22(6) “vary” is defined to include “extend, shorten and suspend”. Thus, parties to an agreement under s. 22(3), such as the transponder lease agreement, in which one party is a consumer, can suspend or extend the two-year limitation period. They cannot, however, shorten it. Only parties to a business agreement can also agree to shorten the two-year period. As Mr. Day’s transponder lease agreement extends the two-year limitation period to 15 years, it is enforceable under s. 22(3).

Day also argued that the 15-year limitation period was unenforceable at common law.  The common law imposes specific requirements on an agreement to vary a limitation period.  These include expressly referring to and excluding the application of the statutory limitation period.  Justice Laskin held that the Court of Appeal decision in Boyce is determinative of the issue:

[68]      The resolution of this issue and its interplay with s. 22 is governed by this court’s decision is Boyce v. The Co-operators General Insurance Co.2013 ONCA 298 (CanLII), 116 O.R. (3d) 56, leave to appeal refused, [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 296. […]

[70]      This court allowed Co-operators’ appeal. The panel held that the agreement was a business agreement, and at para. 16 held that an agreement could be enforceable under s. 22 without any of the requirements imposed by the motion judge:

We cannot accept that an agreement purporting to vary the statutory limitation period is enforceable under s. 22 of the Limitations Act, 2002 only if it contains the specific requirements set out by the motion judge. Nothing in the language of s. 22 offers any support for imposing these requirements. The only limitation in s. 22(5) is found in the definition of “business agreement”. No other limitation appears, expressly or by implication, and certainly no content related requirements appear in s. 22(5).

[71]      Instead, at para. 20, this court set out what was required for the enforceability of an agreement under s. 22:

A court faced with a contractual term that purports to shorten a statutory limitation period must consider whether that provision in “clear language” describes a limitation period, identifies the scope of the application of that limitation period, and excludes the operation of other limitation periods. A term in a contract which meets those requirements will be sufficient for s. 22 purposes, assuming, of course, it meets any of the other requirements specifically identified in s. 22.

[…]

[74]      Specifically in response to Mr. Day’s contention, it is unnecessary to refer expressly to the exclusion of the two-year period. There was no express reference to it in the agreement in the Boyce case, yet this court held the agreement was enforceable under s. 22. Similarly, I would hold that the transponder lease agreement signed by Mr. Day is enforceable under s. 22(3) of theLimitations Act, 2002 and is not rendered unenforceable at common law.

Why this decision matters

I think the real significance of this decision is a s. 5(1)(a)(iv) analysis that suggests s. 5(1)(a)(iv) jurisprudence is maturing into a settled, useful aspect of the discovery analysis.  I note in particular Justice Laskin’s recognition of the novelty of s. 5(1)(a)(iv):

[33]      The appropriateness of bringing an action was not an element of the former limitations statute or the common law discoverability rule. This added element can have the effect – as it does in this case – of postponing the start date of the two-year limitation period beyond the date when a plaintiff knows it has incurred a loss because of the defendant’s actions.

Given the Court of Appeal’s enthusiasm for citing the common law discoverability rule and applying it to limitations analyses under the current Act, this is noteworthy and refreshing.  I’ve written about the damage wrought by the Court of Appeal decision in Lawless, which is frequently cited for its statement of common law discoverability.  If you use the common law test (knowledge of the material facts of a cause of action) to determine the date of discovery, it becomes awkward if not impossible to apply the s. 5(1)(a)(iv), because it’s not a material fact of any cause of action.

I also think Justice Laskin’s consideration of the meaning of “appropriate” is significant:

[34]      Also, when an action is “appropriate” depends on the specific factual or statutory setting of each individual case: see Brown v. Baum2016 ONCA 325 (CanLII), 397 D.L.R. (4th) 161, at para. 21. Case law applying s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002 is of limited assistance because each case will turn on its own facts.

In Markel, the Court of Appeal defined “appropriate” as “legally appropriate” and discouraged courts from giving it an “evaluative gloss”.  In this paragraph, Justice Laskin cites Brown rather than Markel.  Justice Feldman held in Brown that what is legally appropriate turns on the facts (it was not legally appropriate for the plaintiff in Brown to sue her doctor while he continued to treat her).  Justice Laskin later in his decision considered Markel, and found that it was legally appropriate for 407 not to sue Day until the statutorily authorised plate denial process completed.

The Court of Appeal may have defined “appropriate” as “legally appropriate”, but as a practical matter the meaning of “legally appropriate” seems to be settling as “what is appropriate in the circumstances of the case”. I think this is a reasonable approach, though it doesn’t bring any more certainty to the commencement of limitation periods.

Interestingly, Justice Laskin does not cite Justice Juriansz’s decision in Clarke, where he gave “appropriate” an especially expansive meaning (“appropriate” means having good reason to believe there is a legal claim).  Clarke‘s influence on s. 5(1)(a)(iv) jurisprudence may prove to be limited.

Justice Laskin’s analysis also raises some interesting questions:

  • A civil action became appropriate when 407 had reason to believe that it will not otherwise be paid. Does this reasoning apply to other claims arising out of non-payment of invoices? If I bill you for my services, does my claim become appropriate only when it becomes reasonable for me to believe that you won’t pay me?
  • The fact that 407 could remedy its claim against Day by “another and more effective method” was a consideration in the s. 5(1)(a)(iv) analysis. The more effective remedy was statutory, which I think will limit the relevance of this decision to other s. 5(1)(a)(iv) analyses.  Still, what if another more effective non-statutory remedy is available? For example, what if the statistics indicate that engaging a collection agency to recover my many small debts is more effective than small claims court? Will a legal claim only become appropriate when the collection agency’s efforts fail?

Ontario: a rare and proper s. 5(1)(a)(iv) analysis

Chelli-Greco v. Rizk  includes a solid section 5(1)(a)(iv) discovery analysis (which appear in limitations jurisprudence quite infrequently).  Justice Hackland held that it did not become legally appropriate for the plaintiff to discover her claim against her dentist until their dentist-patient relationship ended:

[19]           In my view the present case is an equally compelling situation to support the proposition that the plaintiff’s action was not discovered until the dentist-patient relationship had ended.  It could not fairly be said that the plaintiff should have considered it appropriate to commence proceedings against her dentist while he was attempting to remediate her dental problems which she was given to understand arose from the poor health of her teeth which supported her bridge. As the plaintiff’s expert pointed out, a major problem for the plaintiff was the lack of an informed consent discussion surrounding the treatment she was receiving.  She remained under the defendant’s influence and professional guidance, without proper advice, for the duration of the dentist-patient relationship.  In these circumstances, I cannot be satisfied that it was appropriate for the plaintiff to opt for legal proceedings instead of seeking remediation by continuing to seek treatment form the defendant.

The situation that was equally compelling was that in Brown v. Baum, an excellent decision from Justice Mew that I wrote about here.

UPDATE: The Court of Appeal has upheld this decision.