Ontario

Ontario: Rebutting presumptive discovery is the plaintiff’s burden

The Court of Appeal decision in O’Brien-Glabb v. National Bank of Canada states the principle that the plaintiff bears the onus of establishing the inappropriateness of a proceeding as part of a discovery argument:

[13]      We agree with the appellant that it was the respondent who bore the onus of leading evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that a proceeding was not appropriate in 2010 (see: Miaskowski (Litigation guardian of) v. Persaud, 2015 ONCA 758(CanLII) at para 27; Fennell v. Deol, 2016 ONCA 249 (CanLII) at para16; and Galota v. Festival Hall Developments Ltd., 2016 ONCA 585 (CanLII) at para 15).

Even a vague familiarity with the operation of s. 5 of the Limitations Act means this principle is self-evident, but it’s nevertheless helpful to have it stated explicitly.

Ontario: Does the limitations act apply to Notices of Objection?

In the Wall Estate, the court held that the Limitations Act does not apply to a claim asserted in a beneficiary’s Notice of Objection to Accounts:

[1]               The discreet issue for consideration at this motion is as follows:  Can an estate trustee move to strike a beneficiary’s Notice of Objection to Accounts in the face of the estate trustee’s Application to Pass Accounts, based on the Limitations Act, 2002, or laches or acquiescence?  For reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the beneficiary, Elizabeth Wall, is not barred from filing an objection to the accounts for the entire period under administration.

Marjorie Wall died in 2005.  The objector was Elizabeth Wall, her daughter and beneficiary of the estate.  Marjorie left the bulk of her estate to her two children in trust until they attained the age of 60 years.  Both children were under 60 at the time of Marjorie’s death.  The trustee had absolute discretion to pay funds to the children during their lifetime prior to reaching 60.  If they didn’t reach 60, the will provided that the estate’s residue was to be divided amongst nieces and nephews.  Elizabeth was 54 at the time of the application, so she had a vested interested in the discretionary trust and a contingent interest in the residue of the estate.

In response to her objection, the trustee took the position that he was not required to address it because it was time-barred, either by the Limitations Act or equity.

The court disagreed.  Relying on the decision in Armitage, the court reasoned that if a passing of accounts doesn’t fit the definition of a “claim” in the Limitations Act, neither does a Notice of Objection:

[31]           Based on the facts in Armitage, Hourigan J.A. found that the passing of accounts does not fit within the definition of a claim within the Limitations Act, 2002.  In my view, if the passing of accounts does not constitute a claim, I am not satisfied that a Notice of Objection is a claim.  In filing a Notice of Objection, the beneficiary is seeking answers to questions about steps taken by the estate trustee during the currency of an administration of an estate.  Answers to those questions may assist the beneficiary in consenting to the passing of accounts without the necessity of a formal hearing.  An absence of consent will require a formal hearing.  A formal hearing will assist the court in determining if the fees sought and investment steps taken are appropriate under all the circumstances.

[32]           The objections taken at their highest may result in a reduction or loss of compensation for the estate trustee or other remedies.  In this case, if the objections are successful to any extent, no additional funds would be payable immediately to Elizabeth as beneficiary of the discretionary trust.  The corpus of the estate would be enlarged, increasing the funds available for the discretionary trust, and ultimately, could increase the amount available to be paid to Elizabeth, but only if she survives to age 60.  On the facts here, I am not satisfied that the Notice of Objection rises to the level of a “claim” as contemplated by the Limitations Act, 2002.

This reasoning is problematic.  The threshold question is whether the Notice of Objection contains a “claim”.  If so, as the Limitations Act applies to all claims pursued in court proceedings, it would limit the claim pursued in the Notice of Objection.  Section 1 of the Limitations Act defines “claim”:  “a claim to remedy an injury, loss or damage that occurred as a result of an act or omission”.  Accordingly, answering the threshold question requires assessing whether the elements that comprise a claim—wrongful conduct and resulting damage—are present.

In Armitage, the Court of Appeal found that an attorney for property’s application to pass accounts was not a “claim”. The application did not seek a remedy for any damage, but rather court approval of the attorney’s conduct.

The decision Wall does not quote the definition of “claim” and does not explicitly consider its elements. Rather, it reasons that if the application to pass accounts in Armitage was not a “claim”, then neither was the Notice of Objection.  This is not a sound limitations analysis.

Indeed, the decision certainly gives the impression that the Notice of Objection was “claim”.  In it, Elizabeth alleged that the trustee had wrongfully carried out his duties resulting in a diminution of the funds available to her; in other words, she sought to remedy damage resulting from wrongful conduct.

It may be that the court arrived at the correct decision, but from a limitations perspective it’s a very dubious decision.

Update!

Leigh Sands kindly brought to my attention Iaboni Estate v. Iaboni in which an application judge considered a limitations defence raised in response to a notice of objection without any suggestion that this is an unsettled area of the law:

Did the limitation periods expire, such that the claims made in his Notice of Objection are out of time?

[32]           The objections of Mr. C. Iaboni that the trustee ‘excluded’ many valuable assets such as a mortgage, two businesses, a condo and life insurance policy from the estate of Lidia Iaboni and that when Lidia Iaboni became disabled, her husband’s wealth evaporated and the applicant has no interest in marshalling this wealth is, in part, a complaint about the administration of Umberto Iaboni’s affairs, between the onset of his disability in 2006 and his death in 2010 and latterly a complaint about the administration of his mother’s affairs between the onset of her disability in 2006/2007 and before her death in 2012. His allegations in the Notice of Objection filed in his mother’s estate, as outlined above were in substance the same as those made in the litigation he initiated on December 15, 2010.  All of the transactions about which he complains were disclosed to him no later than the accounting delivered on behalf of his siblings pursuant to the Minutes of Settlement, with the possible exception of the discharge of the mortgage on his sister’s home, which was a matter of public record.  His civil action was dismissed on May 15, 2013.

[33]           It appears, therefore, that Mr. C. Iaboni’s Notice of Objection raises issues as particularized above that are outside of the 2-year period within which they may have been pursued.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision:

[10]      We are not persuaded that the motions judge made any error. The appellant consented to the passing of accounts from the time of the appointment of BNS, and has not appealed that aspect of the order. Even if the appellant were able to identify errors with respect to the abuse of process and Limitations Act claims, the motions judge’s findings of fact on the merits are fatal to the appeal. She made findings that the appellant had not substantiated his suspicions with respect to the discharge of mortgage, the share certificate, or general dissipation of funds. She also found the evidence of the respondent Norma to be credible and reliable. Those findings are entitled to deference and are dispositive of the appeal.

It is certainly arguable that this decision is determinative of the issue, even if the court determined it without analysis or acknowledgement that it is the subject of debate.

However, Matthew Furrow, who is a far greater authority on these issues than me, disagrees.  He notes that really, all the Court held was that the facts were dispositive of the appeal, and not the limitations analysis.  I think he’s right, which means uncertainty remains.

 

 

 

Ontario: the limitation of applications to recover real estate advances

In Scicluna v. Solstice Two Limited, the Court of Appeal reminds us that an application to recover monies advanced in a real estate purchase is subject to the Real Property Limitations Act:

[25]      Although the application judge should have responded overtly in her decision to Solstice’s limitation period defence, she was clearly correct to reject it. In my view, Yim v. Talon International Inc., 2017 ONCA 267 (CanLII), 137 O.R. (3d) 184 confirms that Ms. Scicluna’s claim is governed by the 10 year limitation period in s. 4 of the Real Property Limitations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. L.15(“RPLA”), not by the Limitations Act. I reject Solstice’s attempt to distinguish this case based on the factual difference that Yim dealt with a deposit whereas the “forfeited money” claimed by Solstice is no longer a deposit. The RPLA governs actions to recover “land”, and “land” is defined in s. 1 as including “money to be laid out in the purchase of land”. Ms. Scicluna’s application to recover monies advanced in a real estate purchase falls under that definition regardless of whether it is properly characterized as a deposit.al

Ontario: rectification is a “claim”

The Court of Appeal’s decision in Alguire v. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company is noteworthy for the following points:

It affirms that a request for rectification is a “claim” within the meaning of the Limitations Act:

[26]      In my view, Manulife’s request for rectification is a claim. It is more than just a denial of Mr. Alguire’s claim; it is an independent claim. Even if Mr. Alguire had not brought this proceeding, Manulife would have been entitled to bring an application seeking rectification of the Policy. Consequently, Manulife’s request goes beyond a mere defence and qualifies as a claim for rectification, which is equitable relief: Fairmont, at para.12. The Limitations Act applies to equitable claims: McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86 (CanLII), 118 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 48-49.

This may be the correct result, but the court didn’t arrive at it by asking the correct question (at least not explicitly).  Section 1 of the Limitations Act defines “claim”: a claim to remedy damage resulting from wrongful conduct.  Accordingly, whether there is a claim is a matter of whether there is wrongful conduct and resulting damage.  It does not necessarily follow from a party seeking an order or declaration that there is a claim.  There are circumstances where a party asks the court to do something—for example to order the passing of accounts—without there having been wrongful conduct.

There’s another instance of confusion about the nature of the “claim”:

[34]      […] A claim, however, requires an act or omission of the person against whom it is made: Limitations Act, s. 5(1)(a)(iii). In this case, it is Mr. Alguire’s resiling from the parties’ intended agreement that grounds the rectification claim. Even though Manulife discovered the error in the paid-up values in the Policy in 2007, it did not know, and could not reasonably ought to have known, that Mr. Alguire would seek to resile from the parties’ intended agreement at some point in the future. Manulife therefore cannot be faulted for failing to act with due diligence.

It’s because of the s. 1 definition of “claim” that it requires wrongful conduct, not because s. 5(1)(iii) makes knowledge of the wrongful conduct the precondition of discovering a claim.

The Court follows Albertan authorities for the principle that s. 16(1)(a) should be narrowly construed:

[27]      The next issue is whether Manulife can rely on s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act, which provides that there is no limitation period in respect of “a proceeding for a declaration if no consequential relief is sought.”

[28]      In the context of a limitation period analysis, declaratory relief should be narrowly construed so as to ensure that s. 16(1)(a) is not used as a means to circumvent applicable limitation periods: Joarcam, LLC v. Plains Midstream Canada ULC,2013 ABCA 118 (CanLII), 90 Alta. L.R. (5th) 208, at para. 7.

[29]       I conclude that this subsection is unavailable to Manulife in the circumstances of this case, as it is seeking consequential relief.  The remedy of rectification sought in this case has significant consequences for the parties and goes beyond clarifying the nature of a particular obligation. Mr. Alguire stands to receive significantly less money as a result of the rectification compared to what he argued he was entitled to on the Policy’s face.

The Court held that policy considerations cannot drive the results:

[33]      Finally, Mr. Alguire raises policy considerations in support of his submission that the claim for rectification is statute-barred.  Those considerations cannot, in the circumstances of this case, drive the result.  The Limitations Act was designed to promote certainty in the analysis of when claims are statute-barred.  The task of a reviewing court is to determine the applicable limitation period having regard to the legislation. A limitation period analysis is not a laches analysis where the court’s investigation is driven by the equities of the situation.

This prompts the obvious question: are there circumstances where policy considerations could inform a limitations analysis? I wouldn’t think so, and it seems like the real policy concern is avoiding the introduction of a new factor in the limitations analysis.  It’s easy to see how litigants might seize on this obiter as standing for the principle that there are circumstances where, in addition to the matters in s. 5(1), a court must consider the impact of policy on the commencement of time.

 

 

 

Ontario: Technicalities will not preclude misnomer relief

The plaintiffs in Galanis v. Kingston General Hospital commenced a proceeding by notice of action within the limitation period, and served the statement of claim outside the limitation period.  When the plaintiffs sought to add defendants on the basis of misnomer, the defendants took the novel position that the court could only look at the notice of action when applying the “litigation finger” test.  The court had none of this rather dubious argument:

[6]               The plaintiffs rely on the doctrine of misnomer. They allege that they did not know the names of the proposed defendants when the notice of action was issued. This evidence is uncontradicted.

[7]               Dr. Pattee does not oppose the motion nor does Ms. Rafuse. Drs. Dodge and Ali do, asserting that the doctrine of misnomer does not apply to them in the circumstances and that, because the limitation period had expired by the date the statement of claim was filed, they should not be added as defendants.

[8]               The short answer to this motion is found in the opening paragraph of Stechysyn v. Domljanovic, 2015 ONCA 889 (CanLII) :

On a motion to correct the name of the defendant on the basis of misnomer, as long as the true defendant would know on reading the statement of claim he was the intended defendant, a plaintiff need not establish due diligence in identifying the true defendant within the limitation period: Kitcher v. Queensway General Hospital(1997), 1997 CanLII 1931 (ON CA), 44 O.R. (3d) 589 (C.A.), at paras. 1 and 4; Lioyd v. Clark, 2008 ONCA 343 (CanLII), 44 M.P.L.R. (4th) 159, at para.4.

[9]               Drs. Dodge and Ali advance the novel position that I can look only at the notice of action and, if I am restricted to that pleading, the requisite “litigation finger” points solely at Dr. Pattee. Alternatively, I should exercise my residual discretion and not allow the addition of Dr. Dodge because, at the time of the alleged malpractice, he was a resident in anesthesiology, acting under Dr. Pattee’s direction. Although this submission is not made on behalf of Dr. Ali in the factum, counsel urged me in oral submissions to do the same because of his limited involvement in the care of Ms. Galanis.

[10]           There is no reported decision that makes the distinction between a notice of action and statement of claim relied upon by the proposed defendants. The decisions in Stechysyn and Spirito Estate v. TrilliumHealth Centre, 2008 ONCA 762 (CanLII), both say that, as long as a litigation finger is pointing from the statement of claim, that is sufficient. I consider these decisions binding on me even when the proceeding is commenced by a notice of action.

The court also rejected the proposed defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs using a singular rather than plural pseudonym was of some consequence:

[12]           The fact that a singular, not plural, pseudonym was used is of no moment; to accede to the proposed defendants’ argument that only one party can be substituted if “Doe” rather than “Does” appears in the title of proceedings would be to allow form to triumph over substance.  In this regard, I rely on subrules 1.04(1) and 2.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

 

Ontario: Adding a party after the presumptive expiry of the limitation period requires evidence

The decision in Laurent-Hippolyte v. Blasse et al. is a reminder that on a motion to add a party after the presumptive expiry of the limitation period, the plaintiff needs to file evidence of due diligence:

[21]           TWD argues that the motion must be dismissed because the Plaintiff nor any other affiant has provided any evidence as to discoverability during the relevant time period – that being the two-year period after the date of loss. TWD asserts that the absence of any such evidence is fatal to the motion.

[22]           I agree with TWD. There is absolutely no evidence in this case as to what occurred between the date of loss and the time that the Statement of Claim was issued.  While I accept that Plaintiffs should not be required to send pro forma letters and that the expectations placed on unrepresented Plaintiffs to identify tortfeasors should be low, this does not mean that a Plaintiff can succeed on these motions with absolutely no evidence on the issue.

[23]           At the very least the Plaintiff, or other affiant, could have explained what was happening in the relevant two-year period and/or describe the abilities that the Plaintiff did or did not have in pursuing the Claim. Without any evidence to this effect, a Court cannot determine, as stated in section 5(1)(b), “the day on which a reasonable person with the abilities and in the circumstances of the person with the claim first ought to have known of the matters referred to in clause (a).” I was provided with no evidence on the Plaintiff’s abilities or circumstances. I have no evidence of diligence or an explanation for any lack of diligence. When was counsel retained? What steps did counsel take if counsel was retained? If no steps were taken, why not?

Ontario: the impact of an appeal on the appropriateness of a proceeding

When the success of an appeal in a related but separate proceeding (involving the same defendants) will eliminate damage, is a proceeding to remedy that damage inappropriate until the appeal’s determination?  No, held the Court of Appeal in Tapak v. Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd’s of London:

[13]      The second is to submit that the appeal against the other defendants, if successful, might have eliminated their losses and thus the appellants did not know that this action was “an appropriate means” to seek to remedy its losses until the appeal was dismissed, relying on s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002 and Presidential MSH Corp. v. Marr, Foster & Co. LLP (2017), 135 O.R. (3d) 321, 2017 ONCA 325 (CanLII). In our view, s. 5(1)(a)(iv) is not intended to be used to parse claims as between different defendants and thus permit one defendant to be pursued before turning to another defendant. Rather, it is intended to address the situation where there may be an avenue of relief outside of a court proceeding that a party can use to remedy their “injury, loss or damage” – see, for example, 407 ETR Concession Co. v. Day, 2016 ONCA 709 (CanLII), 133 O.R. (3d) 762.

The Court also included a reminder that seeking a declaration in addition to consequential relief will not avoid a limitations defence by engaging s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act:

[14]      The third is the argument that the appellants only sought declaratory relief and therefore, under s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the two year limitation period does not apply. That argument cannot succeed because the claim in this action was not limited to declaratory relief. The claim also sought consequential relief, namely damages, so s. 16(1)(a) does not apply.

Ontario: the scope of the sexual assault/misconduct exceptions

Jane Doe v. Weinstein considers the scope of s. 16(h) and (h.1) of the Limitations Act, which provides that there is no limitation period in respect of a proceeding based on a sexual assault, and misconduct of a sexual nature:

16 (1) There is no limitation period in respect of,

[…]

(h) a proceeding based on a sexual assault;

(h.1) a proceeding based on any other misconduct of a sexual nature if, at the time of the misconduct, the person with the claim was a minor or any of the following applied with respect to the relationship between the person with the claim and the person who committed the misconduct:

(i) the other person had charge of the person with the claim,

(ii) the other person was in a position of trust or authority in relation to the person with the claim,

(iii) the person with the claim was financially, emotionally, physically or otherwise dependent on the other person;

[…]

Same

(1.1) Clauses (1) (h), (h.1) and (h.2) apply to a proceeding whenever the act on which the claim is based occurred and regardless of the expiry of any previously applicable limitation period, subject to subsection (1.2). 2016, c. 2, Sched. 2, s. 4 (2).

[…]

Same

(1.3) For greater certainty, clauses (1) (h), (h.1) and (h.2) are not limited in any way with respect to the claims that may be made in the proceeding in relation to the applicable act, which may include claims for negligence, for breach of fiduciary or any other duty or for vicarious liability. 2016, c. 2, Sched. 2, s. 4 (2).

A defendant in Jane Doe argued that because the claims against her were not based on the sexual assaults themselves, they fell outside the scope of the s. 16(1)(h.1) exception.  The court rejected this argument:

[26]           With that context in mind, in my view the purpose of section 16 (1.3) is to ensure that, where a proceeding involves a claim for civil liability arising from or relating to a sexual assault, that proceeding cannot be barred by the Act. This encompasses proceedings against third parties (i.e. persons other than the perpetrator of the sexual assault) regardless of the nature of the claim, whether for breach of duty, vicarious liability or otherwise, provided that the connection with a sexual assault is established.

[27]           Viewed in this light, all of the claims against Schneeweiss fall within the umbrella of s. 16 (1.3). Although the claims against Schneeweiss are not for the sexual assaults themselves, they all involve civil liability for actions that relate directly to Weinstein’s sexual assaults on Doe. Schneeweiss is said to have facilitated the assaults, with knowledge, recklessness or indifference to the consequences for Doe. Thus all of the allegations against Schneeweiss in the Claim are “in relation to” Weinstein’s assaults and are not statute barred.

This is sensible and well-reasoned, and the construction of the provisions seems correct to me. I expect this will become a leading decision on the scope of the sexual misconduct exception,  Meanwhile, the context the court refers to is as follows:

[18]           The limitations issue raised by Schneeweiss turns on the proper interpretation of the phrase “in relation to the applicable act” in s. 16 (1.3). Are the claims against Schneeweiss claims “in relation to” the sexual assaults by Weinstein (in which case no limitations period would apply), or are they claims in relation to “other acts” (in which case they remain subject to the normal and ultimate limitation periods in the Act)?

[19]           Schneeweiss argues that the 2016 amendments to s. 16 are to be construed strictly because they create an exception to a general rule and have the effect of taking away an existing limitations defence which had already accrued to Schneeweiss. Schneeweiss argues that at least some of the claims against her, including claims for negligent failure to warn, negligent misrepresentation and negligent infliction of nervous shock, are not claims “in relation to sexual assault” since they are based on separate acts or breaches of duty by Schneeweiss.

[20]           The parties are agreed that the 2016 amendments to s. 16 have retroactive effect since s. 16 (1.1) expressly provides that the 2016 amendments apply to proceedings “whenever the act on which the claim is based occurred and regardless of the expiry of any previously applicable limitation period…”

[21]           Further, the parties are agreed, in accordance with the analysis of Lederer J. in Fox Estate v. Narine,[5] that s. 16 (1.3) encompasses proceedings against persons other than those who actually perpetrate sexual assaults. Lederer J. noted that s. 16 (1.3) references proceedings involving claims for negligence, breach of fiduciary duty or for vicarious liability. He reasoned that this must necessarily include proceedings involving third parties:

Neither party disputed the idea that this sub-clause was pointed at parties other than the perpetrator. A sexual assault is a criminal act. It cannot reasonably be proposed that before a person who carries out such an act can be civilly liable, he or she must have been negligent, in a fiduciary relationship with the victim, or owed the victim a duty. A perpetrator is directly involved and so cannot be vicariously liable for his or her own acts. It is when a third party stands in such a relationship to the victim that s. 16 (1)(h) is extended such that there is no limitation period that applies.

[22]           In interpreting the scope of s. 16 (1.3), it is helpful to have reference to the context in which it was enacted as well as its legislative history. The preamble to Bill 132 (which added the new provisions to s. 16) notes that on March 6, 2015, the Government of Ontario announced “It’s Never Okay: An Action Plan to Stop Sexual Violence and Harassment” (the “Action Plan”). The preamble to Bill 132 further stated:

The Government will not tolerate sexual violence, sexual harassment or domestic violence. Protecting all Ontarians from their devastating impact is a top Government priority and is essential for the achievement of a fair and equitable society.

All Ontarians would benefit from living without the threat and experience of sexual violence, sexual harassment, domestic violence and other forms of abuse, and all Ontarians have a role to play in stopping them.

[23]           During the legislative debate on Bill 132, the Honourable Tracy MacCharles, the Minister Responsible for Women’s Issues, noted that s. 16 (1.3) had been added to the Bill in committee on the basis that the original draft “did not make it clear enough that there would be no limitation period for civil claims against institutional defendants.” The Minister indicated that she was “pleased that the committee passed amendments to make it absolutely clear that there will be no limitation period for civil claims against institutional claimants.” She further observed that “we believe that time should be on the side of the survivors, not the perpetrators. Survivors would be able to seek compensation regardless of when the crime occurred.”[6]

[24]           What this indicates, amongst other things, is that the amendments to the Limitations Act contained in Bill 132 are remedial, addressing broad systemic problems relating to sexual harassment and assault. Consistent with s. 64(1) of the Legislation Act, they “shall be interpreted as being remedial and be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best suits the attainment of its objects.”

[25]           I note that the wording of s. 16 (1.3) includes expansive language to the effect that the elimination of the limitations period for sexual assaults is “not limited in any way with respect to the claims that may be made in the proceeding in relation to the applicable act”. The clear objective of this provision is to ensure that victims of sexual assault may pursue civil claims, not just against the perpetrators of the assaults but also against others who may be civilly liable in connection with the assaults, regardless of when the claim is commenced. Moreover, although Minister MacCharles referred in her remarks to claims against institutional defendants, the reference in s. 16 (1.3) to there being no limit “in any way with respect to the claims that may be made” indicates that claims may also be pursued against individuals who may be civilly liable in connection with a sexual assault.

 

 

 

Ontario: the limitation of human rights claims pursued in court

An issue in Torres v. Export Packers was whether the Limitations Act or the Human Rights code applies to a human rights claim in a civil action.  It arose in the context of a motion to strike paragraphs from a pleading, and because the court found the question undecided, it denied the relief:

[24]           There can be no doubt that the law is unsettled as to which limitation applies.  The Defendant’s own factum, under the heading “Ontario Superior Court’s Inconsistent Application of the Limitations Act and the Code“, refers to a number of cases where Superior Court Judges have applied both the Code and the Limitation Act limitation period in an action.   I should note that it does not appear that the issue was squarely before those courts as it is in this motion.

I have trouble finding any uncertainty, especially subsequent to the Court of Appeal decision in Letestu Estate.  The limitation period in the Human Rights Code applies explicitly to applications to the Human Rights Tribunal.   The Limitations Act applies to claims pursued in court proceedings. If you are suing in court, and if your suit involves a “claim” as defined by the Limitations Act, its provisions apply.