The Court of Appeal’s decision in Alguire v. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Company is noteworthy for the following points:
It affirms that a request for rectification is a “claim” within the meaning of the Limitations Act:
[26] In my view, Manulife’s request for rectification is a claim. It is more than just a denial of Mr. Alguire’s claim; it is an independent claim. Even if Mr. Alguire had not brought this proceeding, Manulife would have been entitled to bring an application seeking rectification of the Policy. Consequently, Manulife’s request goes beyond a mere defence and qualifies as a claim for rectification, which is equitable relief: Fairmont, at para.12. The Limitations Act applies to equitable claims: McConnell v. Huxtable, 2014 ONCA 86 (CanLII), 118 O.R. (3d) 561, at paras. 48-49.
This may be the correct result, but the court didn’t arrive at it by asking the correct question (at least not explicitly). Section 1 of the Limitations Act defines “claim”: a claim to remedy damage resulting from wrongful conduct. Accordingly, whether there is a claim is a matter of whether there is wrongful conduct and resulting damage. It does not necessarily follow from a party seeking an order or declaration that there is a claim. There are circumstances where a party asks the court to do something—for example to order the passing of accounts—without there having been wrongful conduct.
There’s another instance of confusion about the nature of the “claim”:
[34] […] A claim, however, requires an act or omission of the person against whom it is made: Limitations Act, s. 5(1)(a)(iii). In this case, it is Mr. Alguire’s resiling from the parties’ intended agreement that grounds the rectification claim. Even though Manulife discovered the error in the paid-up values in the Policy in 2007, it did not know, and could not reasonably ought to have known, that Mr. Alguire would seek to resile from the parties’ intended agreement at some point in the future. Manulife therefore cannot be faulted for failing to act with due diligence.
It’s because of the s. 1 definition of “claim” that it requires wrongful conduct, not because s. 5(1)(iii) makes knowledge of the wrongful conduct the precondition of discovering a claim.
The Court follows Albertan authorities for the principle that s. 16(1)(a) should be narrowly construed:
[27] The next issue is whether Manulife can rely on s. 16(1)(a) of the Limitations Act, which provides that there is no limitation period in respect of “a proceeding for a declaration if no consequential relief is sought.”
[28] In the context of a limitation period analysis, declaratory relief should be narrowly construed so as to ensure that s. 16(1)(a) is not used as a means to circumvent applicable limitation periods: Joarcam, LLC v. Plains Midstream Canada ULC,2013 ABCA 118 (CanLII), 90 Alta. L.R. (5th) 208, at para. 7.
[29] I conclude that this subsection is unavailable to Manulife in the circumstances of this case, as it is seeking consequential relief. The remedy of rectification sought in this case has significant consequences for the parties and goes beyond clarifying the nature of a particular obligation. Mr. Alguire stands to receive significantly less money as a result of the rectification compared to what he argued he was entitled to on the Policy’s face.
The Court held that policy considerations cannot drive the results:
[33] Finally, Mr. Alguire raises policy considerations in support of his submission that the claim for rectification is statute-barred. Those considerations cannot, in the circumstances of this case, drive the result. The Limitations Act was designed to promote certainty in the analysis of when claims are statute-barred. The task of a reviewing court is to determine the applicable limitation period having regard to the legislation. A limitation period analysis is not a laches analysis where the court’s investigation is driven by the equities of the situation.
This prompts the obvious question: are there circumstances where policy considerations could inform a limitations analysis? I wouldn’t think so, and it seems like the real policy concern is avoiding the introduction of a new factor in the limitations analysis. It’s easy to see how litigants might seize on this obiter as standing for the principle that there are circumstances where, in addition to the matters in s. 5(1), a court must consider the impact of policy on the commencement of time.
