{"id":920,"date":"2019-05-02T13:06:06","date_gmt":"2019-05-02T17:06:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/?p=920"},"modified":"2019-05-02T13:06:06","modified_gmt":"2019-05-02T17:06:06","slug":"ontario-court-of-appeal-limits-the-impact-of-knowledge-of-a-debtors-assets-on-the-limitation-of-foreign-judgment-proceedings","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/?p=920","title":{"rendered":"Ontario: Court of Appeal limits the impact of knowledge of a debtor&#8217;s assets on the limitation of foreign judgment proceedings"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><a href=\"http:\/\/canlii.ca\/t\/hxxb6\" target=\"_blank\"><em>Endean v. St. Joseph&#8217;s General Hospital<\/em><\/a> considers the impact of knowledge of a debtor\u2019s exigible assets in the limitation of foreign judgment recognition proceedings.<\/p>\n<p>The appellant obtained a default judgment against the respondent in a South Carolina court. The appellant commenced an Ontario action more than two years later to recognise and enforce the default judgment.\u00a0 Twelve days later, the appellant secured an <em>ex parte Mareva <\/em>injunction against the respondent.\u00a0 The respondent then obtained an order setting aside the <em>Mareva <\/em>injunction and holding that the appellant had commenced the Ontario action outside the limitation period.<\/p>\n<p>The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge\u2019s decision.\u00a0 It was legally appropriate for the appellant to commence his proceeding after the time to appeal the South Caroling judgment had expired.\u00a0 The appellant\u2019s subjective knowledge of whether the respondent had exigible assets in Ontario did not impact on the commencement of time.\u00a0 This is perhaps the most interesting aspect of the Court of Appeal\u2019s decision because it suggests that knowledge of a judgment debtor\u2019s assets in Ontario won\u2019t materially impact on the limitations analysis outside of unusual circumstances:<\/p>\n<blockquote>\n<p class=\"AParaNumbering\">[<a class=\"paragAnchor\" name=\"par55\"><\/a>55]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Now suppose the plaintiff settled with B before trial. In the Pierringer Order situation, the plaintiff reduces their recovery from A (who did not settle) by the amount it is determined that B is at fault. At trial, A and B are each found to be 50% at fault. The plaintiff reduces their claim against A by the amount of fault attributed to B. A\u2019s net payment is the same 50%.<\/p>\n<p class=\"AParaNumbering\"><u>The Pierringer Order in the Hearsey Action Did Not Authorize Reduction of Recovery Due to Fault of Persons Other Than the Oral Surgeons<\/u><\/p>\n<p class=\"AParaNumbering\">[<a class=\"paragAnchor\" name=\"par56\"><\/a>56]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Pierringer Order in the Hearsey Action is similar to the example above in so far as the hospital and the oral surgeons were concerned. For ease of reference, that Pierringer Order is attached as \u2018Schedule A\u2019 to these reasons. The hospital\u2019s cross-claim against the oral surgeons in the Hearsey Action had been made so that the hospital could obtain indemnity from the oral surgeons if it was obliged to pay the plaintiff\u2019s full damages. To the extent fault was attributed to the oral surgeons, the hospital could recover indemnity from them and thus reduce its net out of pocket expenditure. The Pierringer Order dismissed the cross-claim of the hospital against the oral surgeons. It did not prejudice the hospital by doing so, as it required the Hearsey appellants to reduce their claim against the hospital by the amount of fault that would be apportioned at trial to the oral surgeons, and it provided procedures whereby that determination could be made at trial. If that was all the Pierringer Order in the Hearsey Action did, it would meet the objectives generally ascribed to a Pierringer Order discussed above.<\/p>\n<p class=\"AParaNumbering\">[<a class=\"paragAnchor\" name=\"par57\"><\/a>57]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0However, the effect the hospital argues for goes much further. According to the hospital, the effect of the Pierringer Order was to also reduce the Hearsey appellants\u2019 recovery from the hospital by the amount of fault the trial judge might attribute to the manufacturer and the distributor. These were entities against whom the hospital had not claimed indemnity under the\u00a0<i><a class=\"reflex2-link\" href=\"https:\/\/www.canlii.org\/en\/on\/laws\/stat\/rso-1990-c-n1\/latest\/rso-1990-c-n1.html\">Negligence Act<\/a><\/i>, and from whom the hospital had no practical ability to recover indemnity even if claimed. The Pierringer Order, if so interpreted, would do more than maintain a level playing field for the hospital compared to its pre-Order position. The effect of the interpretation the hospital seeks is to put the hospital in a\u00a0<u>better<\/u>\u00a0position than it was in before the Pierringer Order. Before the Pierringer Order, the hospital was at risk, if found at fault to any degree, to pay all of the Hearsey appellants\u2019 damages without the ability to obtain indemnity from the manufacturer and distributor. This risk was on the hospital, regardless of the degrees of fault of the concurrent tortfeasors. As interpreted by the hospital, the Pierringer Order would free the hospital of that risk. The hospital would be placed in as good a position as it would have been had it claimed indemnity from the manufacturer and distributor and had the manufacturer and distributor been creditworthy and able to pay indemnity, rather than being bankrupt. No reason why this should be the case was suggested.<\/p>\n<p class=\"AParaNumbering\">[<a class=\"paragAnchor\" name=\"par58\"><\/a>58]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Pierringer Order\u2019s language, including that incorporated into the amended statement of claim, does not, taken as a whole, support this broader interpretation. Paragraph 5 of the Pierringer Order provides that the \u201cPlaintiffs will only claim from the Defendant Hospital those damages, if any, arising from the actions or omissions of the Defendant Hospital\u201d, and refers to the \u201cDefendant Hospital\u2019s several liability, or proportionate share of joint liability, as may be proven against it at trial\u201d. But that must be read in light of the context and the other provisions of the Pierringer Order, which demonstrate that this was only intended to ensure the Hearsey appellants\u2019 claim and recovery from the hospital did not include anything for the fault that may be attributed to the oral surgeons.<\/p>\n<p class=\"AParaNumbering\">[<a class=\"paragAnchor\" name=\"par59\"><\/a>59]\u00a0\u00a0 \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0The Pierringer Order was made in the context of an action that included the oral surgeons and the hospital as defendants \u2014 no one else. It was made in the context of a settlement by the appellants with the oral surgeons against whom the hospital had cross-claimed. It dismissed the hospital\u2019s cross-claim against the oral surgeons. It expressly provided that the court at trial may apportion fault among \u201call\u00a0<u>Defendants named in the Statement of Claim<\/u>\u201d<b><i>\u00a0<\/i><\/b>(emphasis added), which meant only the hospital and the oral surgeons. It did not refer to apportionment of fault to anyone else. And it provided procedures, including for the obtaining and use of evidence from and about the oral surgeons, clearly aimed at assisting the parties to present their cases on what fault should be apportioned to the oral surgeons. It provided no similar procedures regarding the fault of any other entities.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Endean v. St. Joseph&#8217;s General Hospital considers the impact of knowledge of a debtor\u2019s exigible assets in the limitation of foreign judgment recognition proceedings. The appellant obtained a default judgment against the respondent in a South Carolina court. The appellant commenced an Ontario action more than two years later to recognise and enforce the default &hellip; <a href=\"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/?p=920\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Ontario: Court of Appeal limits the impact of knowledge of a debtor&#8217;s assets on the limitation of foreign judgment proceedings<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[144,9,334,547,333,43],"class_list":["post-920","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ontario","tag-discoverability-principles","tag-discovery","tag-enforcement-of-foreign-judgments","tag-exigible-assets","tag-foreign-judgments","tag-ontario-court-of-appeal"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/920","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=920"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/920\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":921,"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/920\/revisions\/921"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=920"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=920"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"http:\/\/limitations.ca\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=920"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}